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Note on Terminology 
 
 
When we talk about the relationship between humans and other animals, it is 
important not to lose sight of the fact that humans are animals too. One of the ways in 
which we justify treating other animals in the ways that we do, is by creating artificial 
boundaries between ‘us and them’ (Nibert, 2002). The words we use for example can 
influence our views of the world and thus it is important to use language that does not 
assist further widening of the gap between humans and other animals (Nibert, 2002). 
In this research I have attempted to use words and phrases that do not reflect a 
hierarchy between humans and other animals. For example, I largely reframe from 
using the terms people, nonhuman and animals, choosing instead to use humans and 
other animals. The use of this unfamiliar language may serve to highlight the duality 
present in common thinking about humans and other animals in our every day lives. 
Although the phrase ‘humans and other animals’ is an oversimplification and does 
not properly capture the diversity within the category of other animals, I have not yet 
found a more respectful way to proceed. 
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Introduction 
 
Within most cultural traditions there is a long history of treating other animals as 
though they are little more than resources at human disposal. In prehistoric times 
interactions between humans and other animals consisted of predator-prey 
relationships, but with the Neolithic Revolution and the gradual domestication of 
some other animals, they became more integral and integrated into human society 
(Noske, 1997:7). Humans began to use other animals in sport and entertainment, 
religious rituals, warfare, as pets and companions, for experimentation, fashion, but 
above all, humans have used other animals’ body parts and by-products for food 
(Nibert, 2002, Sorenson, 2011:219). Contemporary capitalism has not only continued 
this tradition, but also greatly increased the scale and intensity of suffering imposed 
on other animals (Nibert, 2002).  
 
Over the last 60 years, predominantly in western countries, methods of animal 
agriculture have transformed from being small scale and relatively slow paced farms 
on acres of land into large-scale mass-producing factories (Singer, 2002:97). Farming 
has evolved into factory farming; a highly competitive and concentrated industry, 
where standardised assembly line methods have almost universally been adopted to 
produce the highest outputs at the lowest costs (Singer, 2002:97). In 2003, 1 million 
calves, 6 million pigs, 8 million cows, 13 million sheep, and 17 million lambs were 
slaughtered in Australia alone for meat consumption (O’Sullivan, 2011:69). Other 
animals, particularly cows, pigs and chickens, have been removed from outdoor 
pastures and permanently raised indoors in confined and overcrowded spaces, where 
food and water is controlled, where light is adjusted according to what is productively 
advantageous, their bodies are modified, they are systematically fed antibiotics to 
prevent disease, and their growth and reproduction are manipulated to increase 
efficiency (Singer, 2002:99). In her pioneering exposé on intensive factory farming 
methods in Britain, Harrison (1964:37) concludes that ‘cruelty is acknowledged only 
where profitability ceases’. Around the world, 60 billion other animals (mostly 
mammals and poultry) are raised and killed for food annually and two out of three of 
these other animals are now raised in factory farm conditions (CWF, 2009:5). Much 
like factory farms, slaughterhouses have adopted mass production ‘disassembly’ line 
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methods for killing in order to process the bodies of animals in the most cost efficient 
ways (Singer, 2002:151). In analysing these phenomena, this thesis will examine how 
the capitalist mode of commodity production has shaped the way we use and treat 
other animals in the production of food.  
 
The industrialisation of food production has coincided with a rapid rise in the global 
consumption of meat, dairy, and eggs (CWF, 2009). Worldwide meat production has 
tripled over the last four decades and increased 20% in the last 10 years alone (Stoll- 
Kleenmann and O’Riordan, 2015:35). But the industrialisation of production and 
growth in meat consumption has occurred at different rates in different regions 
around the world (HBF and FOEE, 2014). Humans in developed countries where 
incomes are relatively high consume on average 80kg of meat each per year, 
compared to those in the developing world who consume 32kg of meat per year 
(Stoll-Kleenmann and O’Riordan, 2015). However, standard industrialised food 
production methods are spreading to developing countries, particularly to those with 
rising middle classes, such as China and India (HBF and FOEE, 2014:10). Booming 
economies in Asia and elsewhere are predicted to see an 80% growth in the meat 
sector by 2022 (HBF and FOEE, 2014:10). The same technologies and practices that 
dominate factory farms and slaughterhouses in the developed world are being 
adopted in developing countries to accommodate the growing demand for meat (HBF 
and FOEE, 2014:10). Consequently, by 2050 it is predicted that meat production will 
have nearly doubled worldwide, for a projected total of more than 465 million tons 
consumed annually (CWF, 2009:24). This trend in consumption and these methods of 
production have severe consequences for the environment, the climate and the 
welfare of humans and other animals.   
 
Factory farming and assembly line slaughter methods produce ‘cheap’ meat, dairy 
and eggs, but are creating serious problems of prolonged and persistent 
environmental and social degradation (CWF, 2009, HBF and FOEE, 2014). Factory 
farming is a carbon intensive process and is currently responsible for 18% of human 
induced greenhouse gas emissions; it also contributes to water and soil pollution, 
biodiversity loss and deforestation (CWF, 2009, Gunderson, 2011:260). Additionally, 
the intensive production of meat is one of the most resource inefficient methods of 
producing food (CWF, 2009). On average, to produce 1kg of animal protein using 
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factory farming methods requires 20kg of feed for beef, 7.3kg of feed for pigs and 
4.5kg of feed for chickens (CWF, 2009:32). The production of 1kg of beef, as a 
global average, requires around 15,500 litres of water, which is nearly 12 times the 
quantity needed to produce 1kg of wheat (CWF, 2009:34). In a world with millions 
of humans dying from starvation and lack of access to clean drinking water, this 
method of food production is exacerbating issues of food and water scarcity (CWF, 
2009:64). Furthermore, in this system of production, other animals are treated as 
objective factors of production rather than as sentient beings with physical and 
psychological needs (Gunderson, 2011). According to the Compassion in World 
Farming report (2009:24) ‘good animal welfare implies that the animal is protected 
from suffering, hunger, thirst, weather, injury, disease, pain, distress and fear and also 
that the animal is free from the frustration caused by being unable to carry out the 
natural behaviour of its species’. Maximising productivity and producing a high 
quality product does not necessitate that these conditions are met (CWF, 2009). 
Therefore, intensive farming methods also have severe implications for animal 
welfare (CHBF and FOEE, 2014). With the predicted rise in global meat 
consumption these consequences are only deepening (CWF, 2009). Thus, questioning 
the production and consumption of other animals is an important contemporary issue, 
which will be followed up in this thesis.  
 
Questions about our relationships with other animals are among the oldest of 
philosophical debates and have risen and fallen in popularity throughout history 
(Cochrane, 2010, Sorenson, 2011:219). The animal protection movement is made up 
of a diverse range of actors including individuals, academics and organisations, who 
campaign for different objectives and outcomes. Mainstream strategies usually draw 
on liberal rights theories, aiming to change legislation and improve consumer 
awareness (Benton, 1993). However, this movement is relatively small. Most humans 
have been deeply immersed, all their lives, in a ‘culture that largely devalues other 
animals and legitimates humans’ self-interested use of their lives and bodies’ (Nibert, 
2002:15). Consequently, challenges to such deeply ingrained ideas and practices are 
difficult for many to accept. Although the animal protection movement does valuable 
work in attempting to improve conditions for other animals, the members of the 
movement rarely consider the role of capitalism in contributing to the status and 
treatment of other animals in human society.   
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The aim of this research is to examine the usefulness of a Marxist framework for 
understanding how the nature of contemporary capitalist commodity production 
shapes the use and treat other animals in food production. In taking on this task, this 
thesis begins by examining mainstream debates surrounding the use of other animals 
in society. It explores the debate between animal rights and animal welfare, 
highlighting some of the weaknesses in these existing approaches to animal 
protection. Following on from this, chapter 1 also introduces the potential for using a 
Marxist conceptual framework for understanding the experiences of other animals 
used in food industries. Chapter 2 lays out some of the fundamentals of Marx’s 
analysis and operationalises Marxist concepts using examples from contemporary 
factory farming and slaughterhouse practises and methods. The 2nd chapter thus aims 
to show how capitalist imperatives shape the conditions and treatment of other 
animals.  
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are dedicated to exploring the appropriateness of Marxist 
concepts for analysing the treatment of other animals. Marx’s work has been 
criticised by scholars of the movement for being speciesist and anthropocentric. This 
thesis will investigate whether Marxism can still be useful for understanding the 
experiences of other animals. Chapter 3 addresses Marx’s distinctions between 
humans and other animals and whether other animals can be incorporated into an 
analysis of alienation. Chapter 4 examines the appropriateness of Marx’s concepts of 
labour, labour power, class, resistance, exploitation and surplus value, with reference 
to modern animal agricultural practices. Lastly, in chapter 5 the concept of 
commodity fetishism is used to discuss the importance of visibility to the way we use 
and treat other animals. The latter half of this thesis is dedicated to challenging and 
discussing the traditional definitions and reach of these concepts to ascertain whether 
they can be used to consider the experiences of other animals. In short, this thesis 
critically explores the question: How does capitalism shape our relationship with 
other animals used in food production and how appropriate is Marxism for 
understanding this relationship?  
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Chapter 1: The Animal Protection Movement and its Limits 
 
Other animals occupy a paradoxical status in human society. On one hand, the 
animals we love are given personal names and are incorporated into our families, 
while others are routinely raised to be killed and eaten. Most humans are enculturated 
in societies that encourage the everyday use of other animals’ lives and bodies 
(Nibert, 2002). The scale at which humans use other animals, whether in fashion, 
entertainment, for testing or food production, suggests that societies’ response to the 
question of whether other animals should be raised and killed for human purposes is a 
resounding yes. However, most humans still profess to care about other animals and 
say they do not want to see them harmed (Loughnan et al, 2014). From this we can 
infer that other animals are regarded by the majority of humans as at least partial 
members of the moral community deserving of some legal protection. That is, they 
believe it is morally wrong to inflict ‘unnecessary’ harm on other animals (Francione 
and Garner, 2010).   
 
Challenges to the inconsistencies in the relationship between humans and other 
animals have risen and fallen throughout history, however, they have never 
commanded the lasting attention of the majority (Francione and Garner, 2010). The 
work of individuals and groups concerned with the protection of other animals can 
roughly be divided into three areas, which are all necessarily interlinked: 
philosophical debate regarding the status of animals, legislative work, and direct 
action (DeMello, 2012). Mainstream literature concerning the moral status of other 
animals has largely been championed by moral philosophers (Taylor, 2009). Their 
intellectual frameworks have encouraged and informed the sentiment of activism and 
subsequent legislative change (Taylor, 2009:8).  
 
The Animal Protection Movement: Roots, Developments and Debates  
 
Philosophy concerned for the suffering of other animals can be traced back to early 
Hindu thought and Buddhist values of universal compassion and has evolved and 
resurfaced at different times and places throughout world history (Taylor, 2009). 
Early 18th century England marked a significant period for the consideration of the 
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moral status of other animals (Guither, 1998). During this period social reformers, 
writers and philosophers started to discuss the capacity of other animals and question 
their treatment in human society (Guither, 1998). This debate focused on the 
capacities of other animals, to feel pain and to suffer, use language, to be self-aware, 
and be able to reason, these capacities were used to defend the moral status of other 
animals (Taylor, 2009:8). Bentham an influential utilitarian figure of the eighteenth 
century crafted one of the first major challenges to the idea that other animals were 
unworthy of moral consideration. He famously claimed ‘the question [for other 
animals] is not Can they reason? or Can they talk? but Can they suffer?’ (Bentham, 
1823:144). These debates prompted legislative changes and the creation of 
institutions, including, the first society for the protection of cruelty to animals, 
founded in London in 1824, which later became the Royal Society for the Prevention 
of Cruelty to Animals (Guither, 1998:2).   
 
The fundamental questions and ideas raised in 18th century England informed the 
development of the animal welfare movement, which gained momentum in the 
1800s. During this time the movement was particularly concerned with opposing 
vivisection and the protection of large working animals (DeMello, 2012:406). In the 
20th century, not only was there greater scientific acknowledgment for the 
behavioural, cognitive and emotional capacities of different species of animal, but the 
scale and breadth in which we use other animals, in particular the mass slaughter of 
billions of other animals, began to draw growing attention from human members of 
society (Sorenson, 2011:219). Consequently, the issues, strategies, and arguments 
coming out of groups concerned with the treatment of other animals have diversified 
greatly. The current international animal protection movement contains a plethora of 
different approaches, with much debate about how to properly distinguish between 
advocacy groups. Animal welfare, animal rights, animal liberation, and animal 
abolition are all common terms used in the discourse of the wider animal protection 
movement, however, none of these categories are clearly defined and these groups 
and individuals do not hold a homogenous position on how to treat other animals in 
human society.  
 
This thesis is not dedicated to the exploration of this complex movement, however, 
for the purposes of justifying the approach it takes to analysing other animals, a brief 
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and general description of the movement will follow. Broadly speaking, advocates 
involved in the wider movement are concerned with the protection of other animals. 
Furthermore, there are two main camps within this movement. Francione and Garner 
(2010) argue that the practical strategy of animal advocates must necessarily be 
informed by theory and the political, legal and social campaigns will be determined 
by whether this theory seeks ultimately to abolish exploitation via establishing rights 
or regulating it to protect welfare. Thus, animal welfarists tend to advocate for 
improving the conditions for other animals used in industry (Francione and Garner, 
2010). Those that advocate for the abolition of humans using other animals tend to be 
in pursuit of animal rights (Francione and Garner, 2010). This debate between rights 
and welfare is at the centre of modern animal advocacy (DeMello, 2012).  
 
While animal welfare has its roots in the utilitarian thinking of the 18th century, the 
central ideas remain and have been reiterated in contemporary animal welfare theory, 
particularly in the work of Singer (Francione and Garner, 2010:7). This discourse 
starts from the premise of sentience; which refers to a being’s capacity to be 
perpetually aware (Francione and Garner, 2010). It is the characteristic of sentience 
that insinuates the presence of interests and thus, justifies the consideration of those 
interests (Francione and Garner, 2010:15). For example, other animals have the 
capacity to be aware of their own suffering, therefore, they have an interest not to 
suffer (Singer, 2002:7). Singer (2002) argues that impartiality requires equal 
consideration of other animals interests when assessing the consequences of actions, 
that is, consideration for other animals entails ignoring the species of a being as a 
determinant of moral significance. However, because Singer (2002) believes that 
other animals do not know what it is they lose when we kill them, he concludes that 
they do not have any interest in continuing to live and therefore death does no harm 
to them. This philosophy tacitly espouses the idea that other animals have lesser 
moral value than humans. Thus, welfare advocates that follow this logic care about 
preventing other animals from suffering but implicitly support the use and killing of 
other animals for human purposes (Taylor, 2009). 
 
Although this debate is mainly taken up in the pages of academic literature, Singer’s 
book Animal Liberation was significant in inspiring a more cohesive social and 
political animal welfare movement, particularly in Western countries (Taylor, 
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2009:8). Since the 1970s, particularly in the West, there has been an explosion of 
interest in the animal question (Taylor, 2009). Hundreds of books and articles have 
been devoted to the moral status of other animals and more organisations dedicated to 
preventing animal cruelty have been established then ever before in history 
(Sanbonmatsu, 2011:29, Taylor, 2009:7). Organisations including, People for the 
Ethical Treatment of Animals 1980, Animals Australia 1980, Animal Legal Defense 
Fund 1979, World Society for the Protection of Animals 1981 etc. (Guither, 1998). 
Generally speaking, these groups campaign, protest, and lobby governments to 
improve the conditions of other animals used in different industries.  
 
The organisations and individuals that make up this movement have both social and 
political intentions. They engage in a range of methods from letter writing and 
petitions to demonstrate public opinion, while also promoting lectures, documentaries 
and television programs to draw public attention to the treatment of other animals and 
push for legislative reforms (Guither, 1998:5-6). The movement has been 
considerable in encouraging uncertainty towards the treatment of other animals, 
amongst human members of society (Higgins, 2011:173). Throughout the world there 
has also been important legislation enacted to improve conditions for other animals. 
For example, in 2002 Germany added an animal protection clause to its constitution 
and in 2008 the Spanish Parliament passed an unprecedented law granting protection 
to other primates (Sanbonmatsu, 2011:29). Francione (2010) argues that regulation 
may gradually improve the treatment of other animals, but it does not consider that 
other animals have a right not to be used as resources by humans. This logic is central 
to the philosophy of animal rights. 
 
The animal rights movement emerged in the late 20th century out of existing animal 
welfare efforts, however, it involves some important differences (DeMello, 
2012:398). The animal rights position rejects two welfarists notions, firstly, that the 
differences between humans and other animals mean other animals have no interest 
in continuing to exist and secondly, that the sentient experiences of other animals 
have lesser moral value than those of humans (Francione and Garner, 2010:14). 
There are significant differences in the abilities of members within the human 
species, for example, some humans have capacity for sight and others cannot see 
another example is that some humans have the capacity to move their limbs and for 
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various reasons other humans do not. The point here is that we do not treat the lives 
of those humans who have greater capacities with more moral significance; therefore, 
it does not logically follow that the differences other animals possess should stipulate 
moral inferiority either (Regan, 1983). Thus, prejudice in favour of members of our 
own species and against those members of other species is a reflection of internalised 
bias Singer (2002:9) calls speciesism. Speciesism, like racism and sexism, deprives 
beings with interests of equal consideration of their interests based on irrelevant 
criteria i.e. their species (Francione and Garner, 2010:83, Singer, 2002). Francione 
(2010:22) argues that if other animals matter morally then we have to apply the 
principle of equal consideration and should not discriminate based on species. 
Furthermore, as long as we treat other animals as property they cannot be members of 
our moral community and we cannot extend equal moral consideration to them 
(Francione and Garner, 2010:22).  
 
What follows from this philosophical conclusion necessitates a different aim for the 
rights movement than that of the welfare movement, although the movement still 
strives from legislative change and public awareness, its priority is to challenge the 
legal status of other animals. Regan (1983) argues that other animals have a right not 
to be used as resources as they have inherent value. This position is in opposition to 
the animal welfare philosophy that comes out of Singer’s work. By this Regan means 
that by virtue of being subjects of life, other animals have value independent of the 
way they are used. The rights position therefore, advocates that other animals have 
inherent value and the right not to be used by humans (Regan, 1983). Francione and 
Garner (2010:15) argue that animal rights ‘applies the notion of equal consideration 
to animal use and not merely to animal treatment and maintains that we cannot justify 
using other animals as human resources, irrespective of whether we treat animals 
‘humanely’ in the process’. Consequently, the aim of this approach is to change the 
property status of other animals (Francione, 2010).  
 
The rights position provides definitive normative guidance for change both for 
society and the individual. The movement promotes ethical veganism, which involves 
rejecting the commodity status of other animals through abolishing their use on an 
individual level, and challenges legislation concerned with the status of other 
animals. For example, The Nonhuman Rights Project is an American organisation 
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working through the common law to achieve legal rights for members of species 
other then our own; they aim to change the legal status of other animals from ‘things’ 
to ‘persons’ (NhRP, 2015). Among many cases the Nonhuman Rights Project has 
recently won a court case were for the first time in world history a judge has 
recognised two chimpanzees as legal persons (NhRP, 2015).  
 
The Limits of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare  
 
In recent decades, the animal protection movement has raised important issues 
surrounding the conflicts inherent in living so connected to and dependent on other 
animals. In doing so it has also increasingly engaged the attention and emotions of 
the wider public (Cochrane, 2010). However, despite the breadth of the views 
represented in the existing movement, there are limits to an exclusively liberal 
approach. Liberal theory focuses on equality and freedom of the individual 
(Cochrane, 2010). The animal rights and animal welfare approaches share two 
important commonalities: they respond to the structural violence experienced by 
other animals with solutions focused on achieving more freedom and legal protection 
for the individual animal, and they target the human individual as a key agent of 
change. Predominantly, they focus on understanding and arguing that the ontologies 
or capabilities (e.g. sentience or the ability to experience pain) of individual animals 
justify recognition and ethical treatment. Whilst this is an important dimension of the 
debate and has been crucial for bringing about change, this downplays the role that 
economic power and structures play in shaping the relationship we have with other 
animals.  
 
Although the use of other animals for material gains is not an invention of capitalism, 
the explosion in the industrialised use of other animals in our economic system is 
intricately connected with the necessarily expanding nature of accumulation under 
capitalism (Gunderson, 2011). Today, over 60 billion land animals are slaughtered 
annually for human food consumption (FAOSTAT, 2010). Mills and Williams 
(1986:31) suggest ‘no social formation has been so deeply implicated in the 
maintenance and proliferation of the mistreatment of animals as capitalism’. The 
nature of the capitalist mode of production has profitably integrated other animals 
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into productive and consumptive processes, shaping the way they are raised, fed, 
housed, slaughtered, packaged and consumed (see chapter 2). Consequently, any 
movement challenging the position of other animals in society could benefit from 
considering the nature of capital, as change to the moral status of other animals would 
necessarily have an impact on capital. Accordingly, the power and interests of capital 
are important obstacles for change. This thesis is aimed at developing a parallel 
narrative that highlights the role of capitalism, which could possibly complement the 
liberal ethics of animal rights and animal welfare approaches.  
 
Marxism, Commodity Production and Other Animals  
 
Over the years, Marxism has been taken up by many social movements, including 
civil rights movements, union movements, antiwar movements and women’s 
movements to explain relations of power and domination, the nature of social 
structures, and the role of capital (Llorente, 2011). Although Marx’s analysis of 
capitalism predominantly focuses on the way the capitalist mode of production 
organises different human beings, the experiences of humans and other animals are 
inevitably linked, as they can be seen to have a common origin in the same system of 
production and exchange. Marx (1959) argues that capitalism reduces nature, 
including other animals, to a means of production and an object of consumption; he 
proposes that nature for capital is mechanical and dead. In this way Noske (1997) 
suggests that just as ‘capitalism dehumanises humans it denatures nature’. This same 
system, Marx characterises as depending on the exploitation of humans also in many 
ways dependents upon the use of other animals as resources. Therefore, Marxism as a 
framework for understanding the way that our economic system organises power and 
relationships has the potential to be particularly insightful for exploring the way 
capitalist commodity production impacts other animals.   
 
 Boggs (2011:71) argues ‘it goes to the core of industrialisation and modernity to 
relentless efforts by privileged interests to commodify and exploit all parts of the 
natural world including most natural habitats and the species within them’. This 
reflects Marx’s (1987) analysis of the way capitalism commodifies human labours’ 
capacity to work, which is at the heart of the alienation and exploitation of humans 
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subsumed into capitalist commodity production. The Agricultural Dictionary defines 
factory farming as ‘a type of farming which is usually operated on a large scale 
according to modern business efficiency standards, solely for monetary profit’ 
(Llorente, 2011:128). The commodification of other animals lives and bodies in 
factory farms and slaughterhouses too seem to be in a large way shaped by capitalist 
logic. The treatment of humans and other animals within capitalism is justified in 
terms of profit and property relations; thus, there are similar economic forces 
influencing the experiences of human workers and other animals. The animal 
protection movement challenges domination and exploitation and Marxist analysis 
draws attention to structures and patterns of domination and exploitation that exist 
within capitalism. 
 
Breaking with traditions that have framed the treatment of other animals as a problem 
of rights or welfare, and utilising a Marxist conceptual framework, this thesis 
primarily examines the use and treatment of other animals as an economic question 
and attempts to explore the importance of capitalist institutions and imperatives. 
There can be little doubt that Marxists and even the critical left in general, have paid 
scant attention to the contemporary animal movement (Sanbonmatsu, 2011). 
However, it has been argued by animal protection scholars that Marxism has the 
potential to be a useful framework for incorporating animals into an analysis of 
capitalism, provided the revision of some of the more anthropocentric concepts 
(Benton, 2011, Boggs, 2011, Llorente, 2011). Although I do not propose that it is as 
simple as just appropriating Marx’s conceptual framework to fit the experiences of 
other animals, both Marxism and animal protection seem as though they are useful 
allies. This thesis will investigate the appropriateness of using a Marxist conceptual 
framework for analysing the treatment of other animals used in the production of 
food.  
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Chapter 2: Marx’s Capital and Other Animals in Food 
Production   
 
A number of prominent animal protection commentators including Benton (1993), 
Eckersley (1992) and Elster (1985) accuse Marx and his work of being speciesist and 
anthropocentric, and dismiss its ability to make any theoretical contribution to the 
animal protection movement. Marx did go to some lengths to conceptually distance 
other animals from humans in his analysis of capitalism (See chapter 3). Nevertheless 
the insights he provides into the social relations of production characterised by 
capital, still have the potential to provide understanding into the ways other animals 
engage with our economy. The objective of this thesis is to investigate the ways a 
Marxist conceptual framework can be useful for examining the treatment of other 
animals used in food production. First, it is necessary to outline some of the key ideas 
in Marx’s analysis of the capitalist mode of production. 
 
The Basics of Marx’s Capital  
 
Marx (1887:26) begins his study of capital in the realm of production with the 
concept of the commodity, which is the basic form of wealth within a capitalist mode 
of production. A commodity refers to the diversity of things exchanged which meet 
human wants and needs (Marx, 1887:26). For example, a loaf of bread can be used to 
satisfy hunger, clothing keeps us warm, and books communicate stories and spread 
knowledge. It follows from this that commodities have to possess both a use value, 
that is, they have value as a result of their usefulness and that they are also the 
‘bearers of exchange value’ (Harvey, 2010:16). Exchange value reflects the feature of 
a commodity that makes them commensurable for exchange in the market (Marx, 
1887). This feature is not an intrinsic quality of the commodity, as all commodities 
have different material qualities, rather, it has to be something that all commodities 
share (Marx, 1887:27). Marx (1887:27) argues that all commodities are products of 
human labour. Thus the value of a commodity is the human labour it embodies and 
the exchange value is the representation of this labour time (Marx, 1887:27). 
However, it is not the actual or concrete labour time that establishes exchange value, 
it is the socially necessary labour time, the average time, intensity and skill level 
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required to produce any use value (Marx, 1887:28). Therefore, value is dialectical, as 
the socially necessary amount of labour required to produce a commodity is sensitive 
to changes in productivity. “Productiveness is determined by various circumstances, 
amongst others, by the average amount of skill of the workmen [or woman], the state 
of science, and the degree of its practical application, the social organisation of 
production, the extent and capabilities of the means of production, and by physical 
conditions” (Marx, 1887:28).  
 
Harvey (2010:37) emphasises that a vital point Marx makes is that ‘value is 
immaterial but objective’. Value (socially necessary labour time) cannot be seen by 
simply looking at a commodity, as value is a social relationship that exists 
contextually, however, commodities also have an objective presence and measure 
(Harvey, 2010). Marx (1887) proposes that the immateriality of value is dependent 
upon a means of representation. This is where the rise of the monetary system and of 
the money form as means of storing value come to represent this social relationship. 
Consequently, whilst capitalism organises production in definite social relationships, 
these relationships are expressed and appear as relationships between things (See 
chapter 5) (Fine and Saad-Filho, 2004:13). Marx (1887:47) calls this concealment of 
the social character of labour in the objective characteristics of products, commodity 
fetishism. This fetishism is ‘inseparable from the production of commodities’ within 
a capitalist mode of production (Marx, 1887:47). It follows that the value form is not 
a fact of nature, but a social relationship that arises specifically out of the conditions 
of capitalism. 
 
According to Marx (1887) capitalism is not just characterised by the exchange of 
commodities produced by human labour, but also by the purchase and sale of 
workers’ ability to labour. In the capitalist system, the means of production (tools and 
raw materials) are privately owned by a group of humans that Marx refers to as the 
bourgeois, or the capitalist class (Marx, 1887). Consequently, those who do not own 
the means of production must sell their labour power (their capacity to work) in 
exchange for a wage, in order to subsist (Marx, 1887). Marx (1887) argues that this is 
a distinguishing feature of capitalism, as labour power becomes a commodity. Labour 
power, not labour, is a commodity because it has a use value (the creator of value) 
and it is exchanged or purchased by capitalists for its value i.e. a wage. Therefore, 
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Marx’s idea of value as socially necessary labour time not only captures the 
distributional relationship of the exchanging use values, but also embodies the 
fundamental relations of production specific to capitalism (Fine and Saad-Filho, 
2004:13).  
 
Another significant characteristic of capitalism is the expansion of value (Marx, 
1887). This requires examining the exchange of various use values. Marx (1887) 
identifies a couple of circuits of commodity exchange that exist in a capitalist 
economy. These trace the transformation of commodity into money and money into 
commodity. First, a commodity, such as labour power, is exchanged for money (a 
wage), which is then used to purchase other commodities like food; this circuit is 
represented as C-M-C (Marx, 1887:71). This is known as a simple commodity 
exchange, where both commodities have the same value and reproduction occurs 
without expansion (Marx, 1887). In contrast, in a circuit of capital that begins and 
ends with money M-C-M’, the motive is to expand value (Marx, 1887:103). In reality 
this is the general form in which capital appears within the sphere of circulation 
(Marx, 1887). Note that capital appears in many forms including money, 
commodities or factors of production, but these things only constitute capital when 
they are used to generate more value (Marx, 1887:102). In an M-C-M’ relationship, 
money M is exchanged for commodities C, and during production, value is expanded 
and exchanged for the numerically greater M’ (Marx, 1887:106). Marx (1887) calls 
the added value that occurs during the production of commodities, surplus value.  
 
For surplus value to occur, during production there must be a commodity that 
produces more value than it costs to purchase. The commodity used in production 
that contributes more value to outputs than it cost to purchase as an input is labour 
power (Marx, 1887:149). The value of labour power is the cost of its reproduction, a 
wage (equal to the subsistence of the worker), and the value workers contribute to the 
output is labour time; thus, surplus value is created when the wage is less than the 
labour time contributed (Marx, 1887:149). For example, if a labourer works a 10 hour 
day, but the necessary labour time to produce/cover a wage is 5 hours, then 5 hours of 
the day is used to create surplus value necessary for capital to expand (Fine and Saad-
Filho, 2004:39). This is called the rate of exploitation (Marx, 1887). Therefore, 
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exchange value, value, surplus value and some use values are created by human 
labour, which is extracted through the exploitation of labour.  
 
The value invested in hiring labour power is referred to as variable capital as the 
amount of value added by it (surplus value) is not fixed in advance but depends on 
the degree of exploitation (Marx, 1887:150). This is in contrast to constant capital, 
which includes the factors of production used to produce commodities (Marx, 
1887:143). Constant capital contributes a fixed amount of value to the overall 
production process (Marx, 1887:143). Due to the expanding nature of capital, the 
objective of capitalists is to increase the degree of exploitation, thereby the rate of 
profit. This can be done in a number of ways. If the real wage remains unchanged 
then absolute surplus value can be increased by having more labour performed in 
exchange for the value of labour power (Marx, 1887:355). This can be done through 
increasing the length of the working day or increasing the intensity or pace of work in 
any given working day (Marx, 1887:355). However, there are obvious limits to 
increasing absolute surplus value indefinitely, therefore, relative surplus value is the 
dominant method for increasing the degree of exploitation.  
 
Relative surplus value is connected to increases in the productivity of labour (Marx, 
1887). When the productivity of labour power is increased, the labour time necessary 
to produce a commodity is reduced, lowering the value of labour power, and leaving 
more time in the day for the creation of surplus value (Marx, 1887:220). Marx (1887) 
argues that there are several ways to achieve this result including increased 
cooperation and finer division of labour, use of better machinery, scientific discovery, 
and innovation. In particular, relative surplus value and labour productivity is 
connected with technological change (Marx, 1887). For example, new machinery 
increases productivity because it allows a great amount of raw materials to be worked 
into final products within a given amount of labour time (Marx, 1887). These 
processes satisfy capitalist tendencies towards increasing relative surplus value and 
thus expanding value, which plays a crucial role in the accumulation of capital.  
 
The practices involved in increasing the absolute and relative surplus value for the 
expansion of capital create competition between capitalists, as they create a necessity 
to accumulate (Harvey, 2010:257). A capitalist’s ability to compete is limited by their 
 22 
potential to accumulate, which can be achieved through the concentration and 
centralisation of capital. The concentration of capital tends to diminish the degree of 
competition in the market by eventually minimising the amount of players (Marx, 
1887). Marx (1887:444) argues that capitalist accumulation also requires competition 
in the labour market to maintain low wages, crucial to this process is a group of 
permanently unemployed or a reserve army of labour. In sum, competition and 
accumulation exist in a dialectical relationship as competition contributes to 
accumulation and accumulation creates competition, as those who fall behind in the 
accumulation process cannot compete.  
 
So far this chapter has outlined some of the main components in Marx’s analysis of 
the capitalist mode of production and revealed the logic and consequences of its 
compulsion toward accumulation. Marx also dedicated significant space to his 
analysis of the way production develops under capitalism Marx (1887) argues that for 
developed capitalism, the factory system predominates, within which the production 
of relative surplus value is pursued through the introduction of new technology. In 
this way, factory farming and assembly line slaughterhouse methods involved in the 
production of meat, dairy, and eggs, offer relevant examples to demonstrate elements 
of Marx’s conceptual analysis of capitalism. Marx’s framework can also shed light on 
the way the industry operates, which will be explored in the next section.  
 
Marxism Applied to Factory Farms and Slaughterhouses  
 
Although our meat, dairy and egg packaging still portray contented cows, chickens, 
pigs and sheep on green pastures in front of red barns and fields of luscious grass, 
these idyllic scenes are far from the current reality of how other animals are often 
used in the production of food. Before World War II, most food animals were raised 
in relatively small-scale enterprises, typically outside and were able to feed on grass 
and sometimes grain (Guither, 1998:86). In Europe and the U.S, many other animals 
were kept in small or medium sized herds on grazing land, and were slaughtered and 
processed on the farm or in a nearby abattoir (HBF and FOEE, 2014). However, the 
number of other animals on small to medium sized farms decreased substantially 
between 1982 and 1997, as other animals raised in factory farming conditions in the 
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U.S, parts of Europe and Australia increased by 88% (Kellogg et al, 2000:34). The 
rise in global demand for meat, dairy and eggs, and increased availability of cheap 
inputs e.g. low-cost subsidised grain and highly relevant technological progress, has 
contributed to the advancement of the factory farming system (CWF, 2009, Gurian-
Sherman, 2008). Although western countries are the ones that predominantly use this 
system, booming economies in Asia and other parts of the world are slowly adopting 
these methods of livestock production (HBF and FOEE, 2014:10). Today, in these 
countries, pastoral farming as a method of food production has almost completely 
died out (HBF and FOEE, 2014). By the end of 20th century factory farming had 
become globalised and ‘agricultural policymakers typically viewed industrial animal 
production as an unquestioned necessity and as a normal part of economic 
development’ (CWF, 2009:19). 
 
With the rise in the adoption of factory farming methods, we have also seen the 
concentration and centralisation of market players (HBF and FOEE, 2014:12). To 
increase economies of scale, reduce market competition, and improve profit margins, 
companies in the food industry are getting bigger through mergers and acquisition 
resulting in fewer industry players (HBF and FOEE, 2014). Between 1989 and 2006, 
the world’s number of major suppliers of poultry in the broiler (bred for meat) sector 
was reduced from eleven to four companies and in the laying hen sector from ten to 
three companies (BD and EcoNexus, 2013:7). Economic imperatives drive the 
concentration of the industry, resulting in bigger operations and efficiency driven 
standardised methods of raising and killing other animals (HBF and FOEE, 2014).      
 
Factory Farming Practices 
 
Factory farming has developed out of the desire for higher productivity and 
efficiency in the production of food, thus, the aim has been to use more capital, less 
human labour and increase the number of outputs. Today, 60 billion other animals are 
used to produce food annually around the world and over 50% of pigs and 70% of 
chickens are raised in these industrialised conditions (CWF, 2009:5). Although 
methods and conditions vary between countries such as the degree of confinement, 
factory farming and slaughterhouse practices are similar enough across countries that 
they can be explained as standard practices with representative examples (CWF, 
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2009). Factory farming is characterised by large-scale production with systems 
ranging from moderate to total confinement and high-density captivity (DeMello, 
2012:133). The physical environment is often human made and human controlled, 
with no open air, artificial temperatures, and unnatural light (CWF, 2009). Most other 
animals are fed on a grain-based diet and are genetically and chemically altered 
(CWF, 2009, DeMello, 2012). Gains in efficiency achieved through the employment 
of technologies, aim to produce more commodities faster with fewer inputs using less 
human labour, thereby, increasing relative surplus value. This process has come 
about through exerting greater control over the bodies and lives of other animals and 
to a large extent ignores the needs of other animals (Galusky, 2014).  
 
Pigs:  
During gestation pregnant sows are caged in stalls or crates so narrow that they 
cannot turn around (Gunderson, 2011). When they are about to give birth they are 
moved to farrowing crates where they are restrained to laying on their side on 
concrete or slatted floors (Gunderson, 2011:265). This kind of prolonged and 
cramped confinement denies pigs their natural behaviours such as nesting before 
giving birth, and negatively affects their physical health causing lameness, unitary 
tract problems, foot injuries and bone weakening (Gunderson, 2011:265). Within the 
first week of life, piglets are castrated, their tails are docked and teeth severed with 
wire cutters, all generally without anaesthetic (Holden and Ensminger, 2006).   
 
Chickens:  
Some egg-laying chickens are kept in battery cages throughout their short productive 
lives, a number of hens are kept together in these small wire cages, each having less 
space than A4 sheet of paper (Winders and Nibert, 2004:85). In these cramped 
conditions birds cannot stretch their wings, perch, or nest and they frequently suffer 
from server feather loss, bruising and abrasions (Winders and Nibert, 2004:85). 
Chickens beaks are also trimmed without anaesthesia to prevent pecking and it is 
industry practice to starve them for around 18 days to induce moulting in order to 
force another laying cycle (Gunderson, 2011:263).  
 
Cows:  
Through selective breeding and unnatural cereal diets, dairy cows are pushed to their 
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limits to produce huge amounts of milk, around 10 times as much as they normally 
would (Gunderson, 2011:264). A leading welfare problem in dairy cows is mastitis, 
(Gunderson, 2011:264). Mastitis is a painful bacterial infection of the udder tissues 
largely caused by unsanitary conditions, unnatural diets and cramped conditioned 
(Gunderson, 2011:264). Cows usually have a life span of around 20 years, however, 
due to the intensive conditions of the industry they are usually slaughtered at 4-5 
years when they can no longer keep up with ‘economic demand’ (Gunderson, 
2011:264). Additionally, to sustain milk production, cows are manually impregnated 
consecutively and after birth a calf can be taken away as early as one day 
(Gunderson, 2011:264). Dairy cows suffer the trauma of having their calves taken 
away and often bellow for days (Gunderson, 2011:264).  
 
In factory farming conditions other animals’ entire surroundings, their bodies, the 
food they eat, and the interactions they have, are all manipulated to reduce the cost of 
raising them and turning their bodies into various commodities. In this process their 
psychological and physical needs are not considered and they are treated like any 
other inanimate factor of production (Gunderson, 2011). 
 
Well before the rise of capitalism other animals’ subsistence cycles were disrupted 
and changed. For example, in feudal society, some cows and horses were 
domesticated and used as beasts of burden in agriculture and some horses were raised 
with the specific purpose of being used in combat during war (Murry, 2011:91-92). 
However, within capitalism other animals have come to be totally incorporated into 
production technology as instruments and objects of labour in commodity production 
(Noske, 1997:14). As was discussed above, Marx (1887) argues that capitalism has a 
tendency towards increasing productivity by decreasing the amount of labour time 
necessary to produce a commodity. This drive to improve relative surplus value in 
many cases is connected with scientific discovery and technological innovation. 
Other animals’ natural reproductive and physiological cycles are considered too slow 
and unpredictable, consequently, a great number of scientific and technological 
devices have been developed to improve the productivity of other animals used in 
food production (Noske, 1997:16). This includes mutilations, selective breeding, 
bodily alterations via genetic engineering and medication such as antibiotics.  
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Factory farming often leads to reactions of stress, agitation and fear in other animals, 
the reactions that incur economic losses are in most cases met with technological 
solutions (CWF, 2009). For example, each year millions of farm animals are 
physically altered, usually without anaesthesia, to prevent damage to the quality of 
the commodities they will become or produce (CWF, 2009). This includes tail 
docking of piglets and cows, beak trimming and toe removal of hens and turkeys, 
castration of lambs, piglets and calves, dubbing of poultry (removing the comb), and 
teeth clipping of piglets (CWF, 2009). In most of these cases, mutilations occur to 
combat behavioural side effects of confinement, which can have costly results e.g. 
other animals sometimes die or their bodies are permanently maimed from fighting 
(Gunderson, 2011). Additionally, modern industrial farms are ideal breeding grounds 
for germs and diseases. The close confinement and copious amounts of waste on and 
around other animals makes them prone to infection (Horrigan et al, 2010). To 
combat this, industrial farms have been feeding cows, pigs, poultry, sheep and fish 
low doses of antibiotics on a daily basis both to keep them alive in their stressful and 
unsanitary conditions, and to make them grow faster (Horrigan et al, 2010). The Food 
and Drug Administration (2010) reported that up to 80% of antibiotics sold in the U.S 
are sold for agricultural purposes. Other animals’ bodies are changed physically and 
chemically in the quest for profit.  
 
Selective breeding and growth hormones are other methods utilised by the industry to 
improve productivity, food quality and disease resistance. For example, selective 
breeding and growth hormones are used to speed up the growth rate of broiler 
chickens (ACMF, 2011). In 1975 it took approximately 64 days for a chicken to 
reach slaughter weight, now a chicken can be ready for slaughter in just 35 (ACMF, 
2011). This unnatural growth rate has enormous costs to the welfare of the chickens 
involved (ESFA, 2010). They often suffer from heart problems, leg problems and 
distorted anatomies (ESFA, 2010). Around 20 million chickens die in sheds every 
year in Australia as a direct result of farming practices (ESFA, 2010).  
 
The industry also uses genetic engineering to permanently alter other animals at the 
genetic level so they can become more efficient for use in production. The 
manipulation of other animal’s bodies involves a wide range of practices including 
reprogramming their maternal behaviour, transforming digestive systems to fit 
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corporate feeding practices, and preventing the contraction of disease (Hanson, 
2010:430). For example, researchers at the University of Wisconsin have identified 
the ‘mothering gene’ in laying hens and by ‘silencing’ it they will be able to remove 
the brooding instinct thereby reducing the impact this has on the hens capacity to lay 
(Hanson, 2010:432). Maximising the productivity of other animals involves 
encouraging rapid growth and excessively high yields by selecting for these traits and 
altering the bodies of other animals. In this system other animals are treated as 
machines and inputs into production, with little consideration of their physical and 
psychological wellbeing. The welfare of other animals is only considered where it has 
the potential to impinge upon profits or the quality of the resulting commodity. 
 
The Industrialisation of Slaughter  
 
The industrialisation of slaughter and the gains in efficiency achieved through the 
employment of time saving technologies involves a complex relationship between the 
means of production, human workers and other animals. Every year 520-620 million 
other animals are killed in slaughterhouses in Australia alone, including, chickens, 
turkeys, ducks, pigs, cows, caves, and sheep (Aussie Abattoirs, 2015). In this high-
volume, low profit margin industry faster production lines are the primary path to 
profit (Cook, 2010). This is achieved through a strict division of labour and rapid 
relentless paced work (Cook, 2010). In the U.S. by the start of the 21st century, it took 
just 15 minutes for a cow to be killed, fully eviscerated, cut up, and packaged in 
uniform, neat, plastic wrapped containers to be exchanged in the market (HBF and 
FOEE, 2014). Therefore, the battle for the lowest prices is fought on the backs of 
workers and other animals. As Marx (1887) argues these commodities we purchase in 
the supermarket conceal the social relations and exploitation involved in capitalist 
commodity production.  
 
With the industrialisation of slaughter came the adoption of production line methods 
of ‘disassembly’, strict divisions of labour, mechanisation, and deskilling (HBF and 
FOEE, 2014). The use of assembly line production methods on the kill floor reduces 
the need for highly skilled workers, a tactic that makes workers easily replaceable 
and more exploitable, so slaughterhouses can hire cheap, unskilled human labour 
(Nibert, 2002:66). In general, the greater the productivity of labour, the less labour 
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time required to produce a commodity, which reduces the cost of producing 
commodities (Marx, 1887). Consequently, the cost of reproducing labour power is 
cheaper and purchasing labour power is also cheaper (Marx, 1887:29). 
Slaughterhouse practices decrease the labour time necessary to turn other animals 
into commodities, thereby, lowering the cost of labour and increasing relative surplus 
value.  
 
When analysing the production of relative surplus value: within the capitalist 
system all methods for raising the social productiveness of labour are 
brought about at the cost of the individual labourer; all means for the 
development of production transform themselves into means of domination 
over, and exploitation of, the producers; they mutilate the labourer into a 
fragment of a man, degrade him to the level of an appendage of a 
machine…they transform his life-time into working-time, and drag his wife 
and child beneath the wheels of the Juggernaut of capital. But all methods for 
the production of surplus value are at the same time methods of 
accumulation; and every extension of accumulation becomes again a means 
for the development of those methods. It follows therefore that in proportion 
as capital accumulates, the lot of the labourer, be his payment high or low, 
must grow worse (Marx, 1887:445). 
 
The harsh treatment of humans who work in slaughterhouses is also mirrored in and 
inextricably entangled with the treatment of other animals. Other animals, such as 
cows and pigs, arrive in varied shapes and sizes, each distinct and unique. They are 
then prodded, jabbed and driven up ramps where they are zapped, shackled, 
suspended by one leg and propelled downward to where their necks are cut, after 
which they are thrust onto a disassembly line (Nibert, 2002, Pachirat, 2011). In his 
undercover work at a Great Plains cattle slaughterhouse, Pachirat (2011) documents 
that there were 121 job functions on the kill floor, each with a very specific and 
repetitive role. For example, function 39 ‘third hock cutter - uses hydraulic shears to 
sever front left and right hoof of a cow’, function 56 ‘ brisket saw operator - uses an 
electric saw to follow the incision made by the brisket marker and cut through brisket 
of cow, allowing access to gullet clearer’, and function 115 ‘tendon cutter - uses 
hands to push cow feet through band saw to cut of tendons on each foot, tosses cut 
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feet onto food table’. (Pachirat, 2011: 261-269). The degree to which the labour is 
divided in the slaughterhouse aids productivity, and in this particular slaughterhouse 
2,500 cows were killed per day (Pachirat, 2011). During this process, they are 
stripped of all their individualising qualities including their hide, horns and sex 
(Pachirat, 2011). The dead bodies are then further homogenised when they are carved 
and cut, and then wrapped into neat plastic packages (Pachirat, 2011). These methods 
are employed to raise the productiveness of labour, thereby, increasing output. In this 
process other animals are mechanised, their lives are ‘transformed’, they are 
‘fragmented’, and ‘degraded’ to the level of an ‘appendage of a machine’ (Marx, 
1887).  
 
Reflections on Marxism  
 
Although Marx was analysing the development of capitalism in 19th century Europe, 
his concepts and understanding of the capitalist mode of production seem relevant 
when attempting to understand the behaviour and structure of industry today. We still 
live in a capitalist system, commodities are still produced for exchange, most humans 
still work as wage labourers, workers are still routinely exploited for profit, and 
production processes are still motivated by capital accumulation. This chapter has 
outlined some of the basics of Marx’s analysis of capitalism and used factory farms 
and slaughterhouse practices to demonstrate the relevance of this conceptual 
framework. The technologies and methods of factory farms and slaughterhouses are 
all embedded in the context of global capitalism. Thus, they are shaped by capitalist 
imperatives that aim to reduce the amount of human labour required to produce 
commodities, and increase the level of outputs to improve capital accumulation. In 
this process, the welfare and needs of both human workers and other animals are 
overlooked as they are utilised by the system in the pursuit of profit. Marx focused on 
the way that capitalist commodity production positions and treats the working class. 
However, many of his ideas and concepts could arguably be extended to examine the 
way other animals are treated in the capitalist production of food commodities. The 
remainder of this thesis will be dedicated to investigating the appropriateness of 
Marx’s theory for understanding the way other animals are used and treated in the 
production of food.  
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Chapter 3: Discontinuities between Humans and Other 
Animals  
 
The reduction of humans and other animals to isolated mechanical productive and 
consumptive units comes about as a result of the same capital accumulating forces of 
production (Berger, 1980:11). Capitalism is concerned with ‘accumulation for 
accumulation’s sake, [and] production for production’s sake’ not with the welfare of 
the creatures it uses to do so (Marx, 1887:412). However, the way that other animals 
and humans are used and treated within this system is different in many ways. Marx 
(1887) theorises about both the continuities and discontinuities between humans and 
other animals. There is still much disagreement over what Marx’s position was on the 
relationship between humans and nature (including other animals) and whether he 
wrote about humans in an essentialist way. Benton (1993:43-44) claims that Marx’s 
distinction between humans and other animals constitutes a dualism that positions 
human needs as superior. Perlo (2002:304) goes as far as to call Marx’s theorising 
about other animals ‘ideological violence’. Conversely, other scholars such as Wilde 
(2000:38) argue that the distinction Marx makes between humans and other animals 
is entirely free of prejudice and that Marx drew attention to the way capital 
accumulation disregards ‘all natural feelings’. The intention of this thesis is not to 
resolve these theoretical disagreements, rather, the challenge attempted here will 
concern the way Marxist concepts of alienation, labour, labour power, value, 
exploitation and commodity fetishism relate to other animals used in food production. 
But first, what did Marx say about humans and other animals?  
 
Marx on Other Animals  
 
Although humans and other animals are different in many ways, Marx is concerned 
predominantly with the uniqueness of the way humans produce their means of 
subsistence. Marx (1887:124) argues that both humans and nature are necessary for 
production, ‘labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature 
participate’ for ‘the worker can create nothing without nature’ and he acknowledges 
that both humans and other animals produce. However, the difference for Marx 
(1959:31-32) is that ‘an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or 
 31 
its young. It produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally’. The 
significance of this for Marx is that humans have the conscious capacity to produce 
with a plan in mind, to produce free from the ‘dominion of immediate physical needs’ 
and with the knowledge of how other species produce, whereas other animals 
produce out of instinct (Marx, 1959:32).  
 
A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts 
to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what 
distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the 
architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At 
the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the 
imagination of the labourer at its commencement (Marx, 1887:124).  
 
According to Marx (1959) life activities (the means of satisfying subsistence) 
characterises a species. For human labour, life activities are the subject of our own 
will, rather than just a means to satisfying a need, and this is what distinguishes us as 
a species being (Marx, 1959:32). In contrast, ‘the animal is immediately one with its 
life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity’ (Marx 
1959:31). Therefore, humankind’s specific capacities are intimately connected to our 
capacity to choose and control what we make and to realise not just instinctual 
promptings but intellectual and social projects. For Marx this means that the way 
humans and other animals engage in labour and experience labouring are different.   
 
The distinction Marx makes between the imaginative labour of humans and the 
instinctual, responsive behaviour of other animals has not held up in the decades 
since. Recent research into other animal cognition increasingly notes that different 
species of other animals have the capacity for consciousness, self-awareness, 
intelligence, language, a concept of time, and the use of tools (Vint, 2009). This 
creates two main problems for theorising about other animals using Marx’s 
distinction. Firstly, these advances in research suggest that due to the specificity of 
capabilities and life activities of different species of animal, the experiences of other 
animals’ cannot be homogenised in any significant way. The bees, beavers, ants, 
elephants, whales and pigs all have different cognitive abilities that impact the way 
they think, experience and conduct their life activities. To suggest that humans as a 
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species produce in a somewhat unique way is not necessarily untrue; in fact it is 
evident in the way humans have come to dominate other animals with our economic 
activities. However, although it is important to acknowledge that other animals 
engage in life activities differently to humans, it is also important to emphasise that 
other species of animals do not produce things in the same way as each other either. 
Secondly, developments in scientific knowledge suggest, at the very least, that we 
cannot be certain other species do not share some cognitive capabilities that humans 
possess. Thus, the distinction that Marx makes between humans and other animals 
may not be as clear and straightforward anymore.  
 
This thesis is not going to focus on disputing the distinction Marx makes between 
humans and other animals. Rather, the goal is to argue that this distinction is not 
strong enough to claim that only humans can be denied the essence of their species 
life when the means of their subsistence is privatised and they are subsumed into the 
capitalist mode of commodity production. The way that Marx theorises about other 
animals requires readdressing in this context to ascertain the way other animals are 
impacted by being used in industrialised food production. This investigation will be 
taken up in the following section.  
 
Alienation According to Marx 
 
Marx (1959) discusses humans as species beings in context to explaining how the 
capitalist mode of production affects the human condition. Marx (1959) was 
interested in how large scale mechanised production of commodities, the division of 
labour, waged work and the private ownership of the means of production 
impoverishes the human psyche and reduces human beings to existence as 
commodities, valued solely as labour power. In doing this Marx (1959) outlines a 
number of interrelated dimensions of alienation that result from humans participating 
in commodity production. 
 
Marx (1959) argues that workers are alienated when they are estranged from the 
products that embody their labour. He wrote that labour gives life to objects and that, 
as labour is separated from these objects under conditions of capitalist commodity 
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production, part of the workers’ life is estranged from them (Marx, 1959). Marx 
(1959:29) notes that labour embodied in the products becomes material as if the 
object has power over the worker and in this way labour is objectified. When this 
happens, nature becomes an alien object on which the worker depends for their 
means of subsistence (Marx, 1959). In this process of becoming estranged from the 
products of their labour, workers are also alienated from the activity of work itself. 
When humans sell their labour power, their productive activity no longer belongs to 
them it is ‘forced labour’ and it is no longer spontaneous or creative (Marx, 1959). 
Rather, the life activity ‘confronts him [the worker] as something hostile and alien’ 
(Marx, 1959:29-30). Marx (1959) describes this as self-estrangement.  
 
Alienated from their labour and the objects of their labour, Marx (1059:30) argues 
that the worker ‘only feels himself freely active in his animal function – eating, 
drinking, procreating or at most in his dwelling and in dressing up etc. and in his 
human functions he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal. What is 
animal becomes human and what is human becomes animal.’ In saying this Marx 
(1959) acknowledges that humans share qualities with other animals, but that to 
express their true species being humans must realise their essence of socially creative 
life activity. When humans are prevented from performing their life activity in this 
way they experience de-humanisation and alienation (Marx, 1959). Consequently, 
another type of alienation humans experience is estrangement from their species 
being (Marx, 1959). ‘In the estranging from man (1) nature and (2) himself, his own 
active functions, his life activity, estranged labour estranges the species from man’ 
(Marx, 1959:31). Thus, according to Marx (1959) the human species is distinctive 
when humans are consciously and freely engaged in life activity, but when they are 
unable to participate in their life activity in this way, labour becomes a means to 
physical existence and is more animalistic. Furthermore, for Marx (1959), as species 
beings, humans develop their sense of self in relations to others through social 
activities, thus he suggests that capitalist commodity production also separates 
workers from each other (Marx, 1959:32).  
 
These forms of alienation are particularly evident in the examples of industrialised 
slaughterhouse production that were mentioned earlier. As the number of other 
animals passing through slaughterhouses increase, the working conditions of those 
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killing the other animals are worsened (Winders and Nibert, 2004:88). On the kill 
floor, labour is divided into very specific and segregated jobs. For example job 
number 11 ‘the bung capper uses hand knife to cut around anus of the cow’ (Pachirat, 
2011:165). The workers are engaged in repetitive actions in every moment of the day, 
they are completely removed from the producing anything in totality and from the 
final product of their labour. For example, only 5 humans on the kill floor see the 
cow while it is whole before it starts to be dismantled (Pachirat, 2011). The roles that 
are performed keep workers segregated from one another and the nature of the work 
is not free and creative. Rather, the work of humans on the kill floor could be better 
described as forced and detached from any overarching goal or blueprint. In these 
ways human labour is alienated in the process of commodity production. Therefore, 
the estrangement and objectification of labour alienates humans through imposing a 
mode of existence in which distinctive species attributes cannot be manifested, in this 
way the capitalist mode of production dehumanises humans.  
 
Alienation as it Relates to Other Animals 
 
In many ways these forms of alienation seem as though they could explain the 
experiences of other animals used in food production. Two theorists in particular 
have attempted to appropriate Marx’s idea of alienation to explain the impact of 
intensive capitalist production methods on other animals. Noske’s (1997:18-21) 
‘theory of de-animalization’ posits that other animals used in human industries are 
alienated from their own products e.g. their offspring and bodies, their productive 
activity, fellow animals, surrounding nature, and ‘species life’. Benton (1993:59) 
states ‘a good deal of the content of Marx’s contrast between a fulfilled or 
emancipated human life and a dehumanized, estranged existence can also be applied 
in the analysis of the conditions imposed by intensive rearing regimes in the case of 
nonhuman animals’. It is the case that other animals engaged in food production are 
removed from many of the conditions that characterise their lives apart from humans 
and thus in many ways Marx’s concept of alienation appears to capture these 
experiences. However, Marx’s whole theory of alienation presupposes that the 
essence of what makes us human is our ability to labour freely, consciously, and 
creatively but that capitalism has stunted and distorted this opportunity. Therefore, 
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the alienation and estrangement of humans from the products of our labour, our life 
activity and social nature is predicated on us being species beings. Whereas, 
according to Marx (1959:32) other animals are not. The assumption that other 
animals are alienated in a similar way to how Marx thought about human alienation is 
theoretically problematic.  
 
Marx’s concept of ‘species being’ has a checkered history; it has been dismissed by 
many and read in a number of different ways (Roelvink, 2012:67). Benton (1993) 
criticises Marx’s concept of species being as humanist, whilst Noske (1997) 
appropriates it to describe the experiences of other animals. Marx (1959) is explicit 
that humans are species beings because the nature of our productive activities have 
specific characteristics. Although it could be argued that in reality some species of 
animal possess these qualities and thus fit Marx’s definition of species being, for the 
purposes of this thesis I will not dispute the human exceptionalism of Marx’s concept 
of species being. Rather, this thesis disputes the idea that only species beings’ can 
experience loss because of the way they are subsumed into capitalist commodity 
production. This thesis proposes to move beyond this anthropocentric conception and 
consider in similar terms the damage capitalism does to all life. 
 
Other animals used in human industries (especially, but not exclusively) within 
current conditions, are in many ways estranged from their natural behaviours and 
surroundings. This hinders the development of other animals’ essential capacities and 
thwarts their fundamental needs, resulting in physical and emotional consequences 
(HBF and FOEE, 2014). Cows, chickens, pigs and sheep do not have much more in 
common than humans do with other animals; they are not the same species, they have 
different cultures, social relationships, methods of communications, habits and 
behaviours (Hribal, 2012). Each species has its own characteristics specific to its life 
belonging to that species therefore, cannot be collapsed into the same category in this 
regard. However, other animals have long been subjected to the same status within 
capitalism (Hribal, 2012). Other animals are treated as property to be raised, bought 
and sold in order to accumulate capital. Their bodies are modified, mutilated and 
controlled to make certain humans more money, and thus their welfare is considered 
only when it is in conflict with capitalist’s ability to make profit. For example, other 
animals are fed because that is necessary for commodity production. Subsequently, 
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other animals can be said to experience the negation of their needs in similar ways to 
each other. Other animals’ participation is clearly different to that of humans in the 
market, but they participate nonetheless, and are subjected to much the same market 
logic and pressures. A less species centric way to think about the impact of economic 
and social relations is required. 
 
Although other animals are not alienated and estranged in the same way as humans, 
they can be said to suffer due to some of the circumstances that alienated human 
labour suffers from. A report done by the Compassion in World Farming group states 
that ‘good animal welfare implies that the animal is protected from suffering, hunger, 
thirst, weather, injury, disease, pain, distress and fear and also that the animal is free 
from the frustration caused by being unable to carry out the natural behaviour of its 
species’ (CWF, 2009). However, the objective of intensive animal farming is to 
maximise the output and cost effectiveness of each animal, even when this conflicts 
with other animals’ welfare needs. Kalof (2007:135) has linked the growing 
commodification and intensification of animal industries with increased misery of 
other animals. Other animals in factory farming conditions are robbed of their own 
subsistence cycles, control over life supporting activities, removed from natural 
surroundings, fed unnatural diets and are unable to perform their natural behaviours 
(CWF, 2009). The loss of these circumstances has been documented to have a range 
of behavioural and physical consequences including stress, agitation, cannibalism, 
and violence (HBF and FOEE, 2014).  
 
Intensive production involving other animals, conflicts with animal welfare in a 
number of ways. Other animals raised in factory farms are crowded indoors in barren 
sheds, are unable to perform many of their natural behaviours including nest building, 
foraging for food, exploration of the environment and exercise (Noske, 1997:14). For 
example, hens in battery cages cannot stretch their wings, sows in gestation crates 
and farrowing crates, and calves in veal crates are not even able to turn around (CWF, 
2009:24). Instead, in many cases other animals develop a number of abnormal and 
often injury causing behaviours which result from boredom, frustration and social 
stress (Gunderson, 2011). These include feather pecking and body pecking, 
cannibalism, tail biting, vulva biting, bar biting, air chewing, belly nosing, fighting, 
mounting, and harassing other animals who are unable to move away as they would 
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do in natural conditions (CWF, 2009:24). Additionally, as ruminant animals cows 
have grazed outdoors for most of their natural and husbandry histories, however, for 
most of their lives meat and dairy cows are kept in feedlot pens indoors, where they 
are fed an unfamiliar diet of grains and hormones, often standing on concrete without 
adequate area to lie down (Gunderson, 2011:264). Fraser and Broom (1990) observe 
that these confined conditions and the subordination to one activity prevents cows 
from socialising properly, which often leads to aggression, and fighting. Furthermore, 
the unnatural grain feed causes a variety of digestive disorders including acidosis, 
bloat and liver abscesses (Fraser and Broom, 1990). Factory farming conditions can 
be characterised as having low welfare potential, other animals raised in these 
conditions have many of the characteristics of their natural lives taken away from 
them, and in most cases these conditions fail to meet the behavioural and physical 
needs of the animals, which has the potential to cause them pain and suffering.  
 
Ethological study has revealed that other animals have the capacity for complex 
social lives (Benton, 2011, Murry, 2011). Many other animals display organised 
social behaviour in the form of communication, skin contact, social play and social 
learning, they are also observed make lasting connections with other members of 
their species (Murry, 2011:99, Noske, 1997:19). For example, mother cows, like most 
mammals have a strong maternal bond with their carves, who usually suckle from 
their mothers for several months, even up to a year (Animals Australia, 2015). 
However, in the dairy industry, calves are taken from their mothers within 12-24 
hours of birth (Animals Australia, 2015). When calves are removed mother cows will 
frantically bellow for their offspring as it puts enormous emotional stress on both the 
cow and the calf (Animals Australia, 2015). As the emotional welfare of other 
animals does not impinge on the quality of the commodity they produce, the 
importance of social relationships are not considered and accounted for in the 
productive process.  
 
It has been established that other animals used in food production are denied many 
characteristics and aspects of their natural lives. This thesis has identified a couple, 
including; access to natural habitat, natural behaviours and social relationships, 
however, this is far from a complete list. These are crucial elements in the life 
activities of the other animals used in food production. Additionally, it is well 
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documented that other animals display certain ‘unnatural’ behaviours when denied 
these elements of their lives. Therefore, other animals cannot simply be seen as inert 
objects used by humans, but as subjects that experience an alteration and a loss in 
their lives due to the conditions they experience in industrialised food production. If 
we take seriously that other animals have the capacity to suffer and that in factory 
farming conditions they are denied important elements of their natural lives, then 
reducing their existence to beings for capital is a violation of the central 
characteristics of their species. The implication here is that we recognise this as 
similar to, but not exactly the same as, human alienation from their species being.  
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Chapter 4: Human Commodification of Non-Human Life  
 
Marx (1887) proposes that commodities are things that satisfy our human needs, but 
that they also represent a socio-historically dependent form of labour rooted in 
dynamics of class exploitation. The nature of value creation in the capitalist 
commodity production produces a distinctive social relation between wage labour 
and capital (Marx, 1887). Capitalists control the means of production and the 
production process, while workers sell their labour power in return for wages (Marx, 
1887). Production occurs in the context of this class relationship, which is key to 
Marx’s theory of social transformation. Other animals are also caught up in this 
circuit of commodity production in contemporary capitalism. With the extension of 
industrialised practices into animal husbandry, other animal’s bodies and their lives 
are commodified to produce the most profits with the fewest inputs and least time 
possible. The nature of these interactions and the way that we commodify other 
animals is based on a distinctive organisation of relations between human capitalists, 
human labour, and other animals, which are historically and economically contextual.  
 
Humans and other animals participate in the market in very different ways, but they 
both participate nonetheless. Other animals occupy a particularly complex location in 
the nexus of production. They are property and they are often used as means of 
production but other animals are also sentient and possess a measure of agency. This 
conundrum makes them hard to place and classify in economic and social relations of 
production and exploitation. Do other animals labour? Can a class framework explain 
the experiences of other animal? Are other animals exploited? Investigating the way 
other animals are commodified and the position they occupy in the process of value 
creation is key to understanding the way other animals are used and treated in 
contemporary food production. The next section of this thesis will look at how 
economic structures influence the positionality of other animals used in the 
production of food.  
 
Labour  
 
As was discussed in chapter 3, Marx (1887) presupposes why other animals are not 
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labourers from the start. According to Marx (1887:124) human labour is purposeful 
activity with a creative vision in mind, whereas other animals do not possess these 
capacities. When other animals produce, it is out of necessity (Marx, 1887:124). For 
example, when a chicken makes a nest and bees build a hive it is only instinct guiding 
this process (Marx, 1887:124). However, in chapter 3, it was argued that the 
distinction Marx makes between the way humans and other animals produce things is 
not this clear cut. Progress in research on the behaviour and cognition of other species 
suggests that it is difficult to talk about other animals as a homogenous group and 
also that it is hard to be clear exactly how other animals experience life activities. To 
be clear, this argument does not deny that human labour is unique, however the 
degree to which it is unique is blurry. Clarke (2014:151) argues ‘the uniqueness of 
human labour is likely to be a matter of degree rather than kind’.  
 
Nevertheless, Marx’s (1887) definition of labour is very specifically referring to the 
uniqueness of human labour. Humans are not the only animals that transform nature, 
however, human labour does it with a high level of consciousness (Marx, 1887). This 
definition requires a demonstration of intention, which is difficult to prove in the case 
of different species of animals. Thus, trying to expand Marx’s narrow category of 
labour to include other animals, considering the heterogeneousness of their capacities 
might stretch the concept of labour beyond breaking point. Furthermore, to gain any 
ground for other animals in relation to their moral status in society, it is important to 
base this in the reality of their uniqueness not due to their commonalities with 
humans. Consequently, this section will discuss the uniqueness of the way other 
animals engage in the labour process of food production.  
 
Marx (1887:124) divides the labour process into three main elements; the activity of 
human labour, the objects on which work is performed and the instruments used for 
that work. Together the objects and instruments of labour constitute the means of 
production and it is here that Marx classifies the contribution of other animals to the 
productive process. In the labour process ‘man’s activity, with the help of the 
instruments of labour, effects an alteration in the object of labour, designed from the 
commencement’ (Marx, 1887:126). For Marx (1887) whether something is classified 
as an instrument, an object or both is determined not just by its nature but also by its 
specific function in the labour process. An instrument of labour includes ‘all the 
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objective conditions necessary for carrying on the labour process… i.e. animals 
which have been bred for the purpose, and have undergone modification by means of 
labour, play a chief part as instruments of labour’ (Marx, 1887:125). For example, 
chickens’ bodies are modified, bred, raised, and commodified by human labour to 
assist in the production of eggs. Human labour is involved in selecting the breed of 
chickens used, overseeing the hatching of chicks, discarding the male chicks, 
debeaking, feeding and watering them, monitoring behaviour, and removing eggs 
(Torres, 2007:40-44). Objects of labour refer more to the raw materials and objects 
which human labour plays no part in the creation of. For example, Marx (1887:126) 
classifies uncaught fish as ‘objects of labour spontaneously provided by nature’.  
 
Industrialised practices in factory farms and slaughterhouses do treat other animals as 
instruments and objects of labour, they are used as mindless tools to aid capital 
accumulation. As was discussed in chapter 3, other animal’s bodies are subsumed 
into the labour process in ways that deny their natural behaviours and environments, 
for the benefit of the capitalist and to the detriment of the animal’s welfare. In this 
way other animals are used as instruments of labour. Other animals’ biologically 
inherited powers of growth and reproduction are utilised in ways that contribute to 
the realisation of surplus value and have become integral parts of the production 
process. For example, intensive pig operations control the reproductive process of 
pigs to ensure that they occur in the most efficient ways (Gunderson, 2011). Boar 
semen is either bought from laboratories or the boar itself is bought and trained to 
mount stationary objects known as ‘dummy sows’ by being aroused in various ways, 
the semen is then assessed for quality and later squeezed through a inseminating 
catheter into the female pigs cervix to impregnate her (Gunderson, 2011:265). 
However, Marx’s (1887) explanation of other animals, in particular domesticated 
animals, as examples of instruments of labour was not a reference purely to a 
capitalist mode of production. Marx’s (1887) ideas about the labour process are 
independent of any specific social formation; rather, he argues that the labour process 
is a necessary condition of human existence. Implicit in this is that other animals can 
only be instruments of labour in any mode of production.  
 
The capitalist mode of production may treat other animals as instruments and objects 
of labour, but that does not mean that theories about their contribution to the labour 
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process have to categorise them only in this way. Additionally, just because other 
animals are used and treated like instruments and objects of human labour under 
certain modes if production does not mean that this has to be the case for all modes of 
production. Marx’s (1887:125) classification of other animals alongside primitive 
tools such as ‘stones, wood, bones and shells’ relegates them to the status of 
submissive, inanimate, impartial objects. For living beings to be physically and 
theoretically treated in this way rather than as active entities involved in production 
requires the denial that they have interests and disregards their abilities. ‘To regard 
the animal as a mere tool’, Ingold (2000:207) writes, ‘is to deny its capacity for 
autonomous movement… tools cannot ‘act back’ or literally interact with their users, 
they only conduct the users’ action on the environment’. There are plenty of 
examples where other animals act for themselves. Noske (1993:153) documents that 
other animals have the capacity to cry, struggle, and attempt escape. For example, 
whales sometimes attack-whaling ships. Hribal (2007) argues that other animal’s 
respond to threats using different methods and tactics, they resist, rebel, attack, and 
fight back. He documents accounts where cows ignore commands, drag their hooves, 
refuse to move, break equipment, where chickens peck each other and humans, and 
pigs escape pens (Hribal, 2007). Although other animals can and are used in the 
labour process as instruments to aid human labour, their contribution does not seem 
completely reducible to the contribution of inanimate factors of production.  
 
Haraway (2008:80) argues that ‘animals are working subjects not just worked 
objects’ or the instruments with which that work is done. This is significant as it 
suggests that other animals are not inherently instruments of labour or labourers, but 
that they possess the capacity to be both, potentially even at the same time. 
Additionally, that these conditions come about as a consequence of the specific mode 
of production. Marx (1887) talks about the alienation of human labour from their 
species being (the attribute that makes human labour unique) within systems of 
capitalism and slavery, yet still refers to humans producing things under these 
systems as labour. This suggests that the work human’s do is considered labour even 
if the quality of it being purposeful is absent. It has been established that other 
animals are not just objects but have the capacity to resist and to work. Therefore, is 
it possible to talk about the work of other animals as a form of labour? Whether other 
animals are labourers or means of production (or both) comes down to the role that 
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the particular animals play in a particular labour process, which depends upon the 
intentional structure of that process (Clarke, 2014:147).   
 
Although Marx’s definition of labour cannot necessarily be stretched to include other 
animals, it is important to acknowledge other definitions of labour for understanding 
the unique contributions of other animals to the labour process. Marx (1887) on a 
simple level defines labour as a process of transforming something into something 
else. Whether or not this process is done actively may distinguish human labour but it 
does not necessarily exclude the work done by other animals. Other animals 
participate in the labour process where something is turned into something else. 
Maybe a definition of labour that enables the inclusion of all other animals stretches 
to include biological labour. For example, the milk produced by dairy cows, the eggs 
produced by chickens, or the flesh produced by chickens, cows, pigs and sheep. 
Although it is difficult to identify and distinguish the contribution of the animal 
because human labour is in most circumstances involved in producing a commodity, 
there is a contribution made by that animal. This contribution could constitute a form 
of labour not identical to human labour, but a form of labour that is not as narrowly 
defined by the characteristics of its contributor. This reminds us that much like 
humans, other animals can be enrolled in the labour process not just as means of 
production but also as labourers. Marx’s (1887) classification of other animals only 
as instruments or objects of labour, does not consider that other animals can labour, 
albeit labour that does not necessarily fit the mould of the exclusively human form of 
labour he defines in Capital.  
 
Taking other animals seriously as workers could potentially strengthen the plight for 
improving the conditions of other animals in food production. Refashioning the 
category of labour to include other animals could help to challenge the paradigm of 
human exceptionalism that helps justify so much violence against other animals 
(Clarke, 2014:157). At the very least remembering that other animals have the 
capacity to labour and that their inclusion in the labour process in some cases 
commodifies this capacity reminds us that they are subjects that are treated as objects. 
A labour process that treats other animals as objects and that commodifies their 
bodies and biological capacities highlights the relations of domination to which other 
animals are subjected. To understand this relationship of domination and how it 
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differs to human subjugation under capitalism further we will now turn to an analysis 
of labour power and class.  
 
Class, Labour Power and Resistance  
 
Marx (1973) was concerned with revealing the experiences of human labour under 
capitalism by demonstrating how the nature of capitalist commodity production 
positions the working class in exploitative relationships with capital. For Marx, the 
basis of capitalism is an exploitative social relationship between a property owning 
capitalist class and a property-less class of free wage labourers (Murry, 2011:89). Our 
relationship with many other animals is also characterised by this system of 
globalised capital accumulation. Like any other commodity that comes out of the 
capitalist system, animal products are produced in the context of social relations 
characterised by dominance, unequal power (derived from property relations), and 
exploitation (Murry, 2011). A reoccurring theme amongst some animal studies 
scholarship is an attempt to fit other animals into Marxist class relations. This next 
section will look at the adequacy of using a class framework to understand relations 
between humans and other animals in industrialised food production.  
 
Hribal (2003) Perlo (2002) and Torres (2007) argue that in many ways other animals 
are like the working class in a Marxist analysis of labour. Other animals are property-
less, their bodies serve as commodities when their flesh is turned into meat, and they 
produce commodities such as eggs, milk, and cheese (Torres, 2007:38). The 
commodification of other animals occurs within a system that is designed to leverage 
other animals’ abilities and bodies to produce products for profit. Thus, as unwaged 
labourers, other animals not only become commodities themselves but these 
commodities also support the development and maintenance of industrial capital 
(Hribal, 2003). Hribal (2003:436) claims that the labour of other animals although 
unwaged has a history of ‘expropriation, exploitation and resistance’ like human 
labour in Marx’s working class. Hribal (2003:435) argues that the enclosure of other 
animals into factory farming conditions has made them far more dependent upon 
humans for their feeding and care, ‘as their customary rights of pasture and pannage’ 
have been removed. This relationship of dependency can be in some ways compared 
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to the illusionary freedom the human worker has to sell their labour power to 
capitalists in order to subsist. Although there may be some similarities between the 
way that the working class and other animals are treated within contemporary 
capitalism, there are far more differences.  
 
According to Marx a key characteristic of human labour under capitalism is that it is 
waged labour. At the heart of human waged labour is the nature of property relations 
under capitalism. As the capitalist class has a monopoly over the means of 
production, in order to subsist, human labour must sell their labour power. ‘Labour 
power or the capacity for labour is to be understood as the aggregate of those mental 
and physical capabilities existing in a human being, which he exercises when he 
produces a use value of any description’ (Marx, 1887:117). What characterises 
capitalism as a distinctive mode of production is the commodification of labour 
power (Marx, 1887). The capitalist purchases the workers capacity to labour and 
produce use values for a certain period of time. These exchange conditions come 
about because; the proprietor is dispossessed of access to the means of production 
thus not in a position to sell another commodity, and the labourer is free to sell their 
own capacity to labour (Marx, 1887:117). Therefore, there are some significant ways 
in which other animals are not like the working class.  
 
The position other animals occupy is significantly different to that of human labour 
under capitalism. The dubious freedoms enjoyed by human workers, particularly the 
freedom to commodify our labour, are conspicuously absent from the lives of other 
animals used by humans. In most western legal systems, other animals are relegated 
to the status of things, or more specifically the property of humans and have only 
extrinsic or conditional value as a means to an end (Francione, 1995). As a result of 
their proprietary status, other animals are not afforded legal rights. As far as the law 
is concerned other animals are nothing more than commodities, and are only very 
basically protected from ‘unnecessary suffering’ (Francione, 1995). Other animals, 
therefore, are not free to engage in exchange for their labour. Due to their legal status 
they are disposed of their autonomy and thus they do not possess what Marx defines 
as labour power.  
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It has also been argued that other animals are somewhat more like slaves throughout 
history (Murry, 2011). As a source of free labour that can be bought and sold at the 
will of their ‘owners’, the experiences of other animals may be more akin to the 
unwaged labour of human slaves and serfs (Dickens, 2003). The enslavement of 
humans has been practiced throughout the world at various times and instituted in 
various ways, notably in the Americas (1492-1865) and during the Roman Empire 
(150BCE-350CE). Therefore, it is difficult to talk about slavery as a uniform class 
system. However, broadly speaking Marx (1973) characterises slavery as a system 
where humans are purchased in the same way that machinery is purchased. Marx 
(1973:940) argues that just like the means of production, slaves have an exchange 
value and the price paid for the slave represents the anticipated profit, ‘which is to be 
ground out of him’.  
 
In the same way, other animals’ whole lives and bodies are purchased and 
commodified. Other animals do not have a split between home and work life and 
there is no end to their working day. They are serving the interests of those who wish 
to profit from them 24 hours a day from birth to their early deaths, never outside of 
the grasp of this productive system (Torres, 2007: 38). Other animals do not naturally 
become private property any more than humans naturally come to sell their labour 
power; these conditions are historically contextual. These conditions of unwaged 
labour are just as they have been for past exploitative economic systems, part of 
accumulation (Hribal, 2003). However, to what extent do other animals fit into a 
Marxist analysis of slavery? Although Marx (1973:464) acknowledges that slavery 
was involved in the development of early capitalism, he argues that slavery appears 
‘as an anomaly, opposite the bourgeois system itself’. However, if we are considering 
other animals to be slaves within this system, then slavery has not at all disappeared 
in contemporary capitalism. Rather than appearing as an anomaly, the enslavement of 
other animals has become embedded in and an intrinsic component of capitalist 
economies (Murry, 2011).  
 
There are two main issues with trying to apply Marxist class analysis to understand 
the position other animals hold in society. Firstly, the nonhomogeneous nature of the 
category of other animals and the diversity in the ways they are used and treated in 
human society potentially makes it hard to use one class category to explain the 
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position of all other animals. Secondly, for Marx (1887) key to the concept of the 
working class and even slavery (to a lesser extent) was the revolutionary potential of 
these human groups. However, other animals are more limited in their abilities to 
unite and revolt. There has been some discussion about the capacity for other animals 
to resist and struggle. Hribal (2003) and Kowalczyk (2014) argue that other animals 
do indeed struggle against capital, they are able to resist and fight back, disrupting the 
productive process in which they are being used. However, other animal’s capacity 
for struggle is necessarily quantitatively different than the global proletarian 
revolution that Marx had in mind in his understanding of class struggle (Torres, 
2007:39). Compared to humans, other animals are limited in their capacity to unite 
and fight back as a collective group.  
 
Kowalczyk (2014:193) argues that we need to re-conceptualise agency away from 
treating the ‘male waged worker’ mode of resistance as universal, rather we should 
take a broader interpretation of the word. Perceiving the actions of other animals as 
resistance has the potential to refocus the debates about the role of other animals in 
production (Kowalczyk, 2014). Rather than being victimised, it could empower the 
movement through blurring hierarchical divisions imposed by capital (Kowalczyk, 
2014). The idea of class struggle as a transformative force is inadequate for theorising 
about change for other animals within this productive system. Kowalczyk (2014) 
argues that using a definition of resistance and struggle that excludes other animals 
could legitimize the existing system of capitalist power relations rather than 
undermine it. Additionally, using the concept of the working class or slavery to 
describe other animal’s labour and contribution to the production process can obscure 
some key differences between humans and other animals and the forms of 
domination they each experience.  
 
It seems that other animals do not neatly fit into a traditional Marxist class analysis of 
social relations within capitalism. While other animals have played a role in the 
development and maintenance of industrial and agricultural capital that looks a bit 
like slavery, and a bit like unwaged labour, it may be more useful to create another 
category that more accurately explains where other animals fit. Defining a class 
category that can encompass the conditions and experiences of other animals within 
the capitalist relations of production is a little outside the scope and capacity of this 
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thesis. This section has been aimed at drawing attention to some of the inadequacies 
of the traditional Marxist class analysis in being able to include other animals. Marx’s 
class analysis is key to understanding exploitative relations of production and is 
important to theorising about change; thus, it is an important area for further research. 
It has been discussed that in the productive process other animals are used as means 
of production, as labour, that they have the capacity to resist and that they occupy a 
precarious position as living commodities. Now let’s turn to characterising the nature 
of these relationships. Are we exploiting other animals? 
 
Exploitation and Surplus Value  
    
Although we frequently claim that acts or practices are exploitative, the concept of 
exploitation is typically invoked without much analysis or argument as if the meaning 
is self-evident. However, the concept of exploitation has a long history of use and the 
definition is still the subject of much debate. Marx does not share such an all-
encompassing account of exploitation, rather, he rejects the moral framing of the 
notion and uses the concept to characterise a specific labour relationship. Marx’s 
(1887) theory of exploitation is related to the unequal exchange of labour and the 
existence of profits. These features reflect the way in which capitalist’s appropriate 
surplus value (Marx, 1887). Marx (1887:227) wrote, ‘the end and aim of capitalist 
production, is to extract the greatest possible amount of surplus value, and 
consequently to exploit labour-power to the greatest possible extent’. The notion of 
exploitation is tied up with the nature of commodity production and remains a central 
concept in any Marxist analysis of the capitalist mode of production.  
 
Capitalist commodity production and exchange is aimed at the expansion of value 
and accumulation of capital. The question this raises is where is the surplus value 
coming from? Marx (1887) argued that in production there is a commodity that 
produces more value than it is worth and that commodity is labour power. The 
labourers sell their labour power to the capitalist for its exchange value – a wage, 
which represents the socially necessary labour time required to reproduce labour 
power (Marx, 1887:119). That is, the wage should equal the value of the commodities 
needed reproduce labour power. Thus, labour power is a unique commodity, as its 
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use-value, (the creation of use-values) is a source of value, and the exchange value of 
labour power is worth less than the value that it can create. A portion of the working 
day is spent completing the labour time necessary to produce the wage (and sustain 
the workers) and the extra hours in the day are spent producing surplus value (Marx, 
1887). The ratio of the labour in which the worker produces the capitalist’s surplus to 
the labour time in which the workers produces their own wage, Marx (1887) calls, the 
rate of exploitation. Therefore, Marx’s definition of exploitation is very technical and 
is specifically used to describe the extraction of surplus value from labour power, in 
the context of waged labour.  
 
For Marx (1887), value, unlike the labour process, is fundamental to capitalist 
production. It reflects the class relationship between wage labour and capital and thus 
is not universal (Harvey, 2010:36). The exchange of commodities requires an 
equivalent form, a characteristic that makes them commensurable (Marx, 1887:39). 
Marx (1887) argues that abstract human labour is the common characteristic that all 
commodities share and thus is responsible for establishing exchange value. This can 
only be the case in a system of waged labour, where the value of commodities is 
merely a mode of expressing all human labour as equal in its exchange value (Marx, 
1887:39). ‘Exchange cannot take place without equality and equality not without 
commensurability’ (Marx, 1887:39). Marx (1887:39) observes that this is why 
Aristotle was unable to attribute value to commodities, because Greek society was 
founded upon slavery, which is based on the inequality of human labour and labour 
power. Marx (1887:39-40) argues that value cannot be ‘deciphered until the notion of 
human equality has already acquired the fixity of a popular prejudice’. Therefore, for 
Marx, exploitation is confined to describing relations between waged labour power 
and capital, and to cases of surplus extraction in the labour process. This framework 
does not take into account categories of workers such as the unemployed, volunteers, 
homemakers and other animals, who can work but do not sell their labour power and 
do not produce any surplus value for the capitalist to appropriate (Verma, 1998). 
 
As was discussed in the previous section, other animals do not participate in food 
production in the same way that wage labour does. According to Marx, other animals 
cannot be considered to have labour power, as they are not free to sell their capacity 
to labour, thus, their participation in production is not exchanged for its value. This 
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means that other animals do not spend a portion of the working day or their working 
lives covering the cost of reproducing their labour power. Therefore, other animals 
may produce use values and they may even produce surpluses, but according to 
Marx’s framework they do not produce surplus value or add exchange value to 
commodities (Marx, 1887). Therefore, the relationship other animals have with 
capital is not exploitative. Marx (1887) saw other animals as fixed capital along with 
inanimate factors of production; they contribute value to the finished commodity only 
via the congealed human labour that was involved in their production. This is 
difficult to refute because where other animals contributed to the production of 
commodities, human labour is also involved, making it hard to point to the 
contribution made specifically by the animal. Thus, it is difficult to argue that other 
animals contribute to surplus value in this way they are excluded from Marx’s 
analysis of exploitation.  
 
Although Marx’s definition of exploitation refers to a specific relationship of 
appropriating value, the term exploitation is frequently invoked in ordinary moral and 
political discourse, including in describing the way humans treat other animals. 
Donald Watson, who first outlined the ideology of veganism in 1944 suggested that 
‘veganism denotes a philosophy and way of living which seeks to exclude, as far as is 
possible and practical, all forms of exploitation of and cruelty to, animals for food, 
clothing, or any other purpose’ (Stepaniak, 2000:3). Animal protection organisations 
such as PETA, Animals Australia, and Voiceless also use the terminology of 
exploitation to describe the way humans treat other animals. Academic debate about 
other animals adopts this discourse too. Singer (2009:504) argues ‘if possessing a 
higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his or her 
own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans?’ Although exploitation in 
these cases is not well defined and in some cases is used as a catchall term for 
oppressive relations, it is important to be able to include other animals in the 
discussion about unequal economic/power relationships and look at the ways that 
capitalist accumulation motives are responsible for this kind of relationship.  
 
Marx’s theory of capitalist exploitation is not only aimed at identifying relationships 
of power and domination in an attempt to challenge and change them. Rather, it was 
part of a wider class analysis aimed at identifying conflicting class interests and 
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understanding class struggle. Whereas, the term exploitation used in context to new 
social movements is aimed at identifying a relationship that is ‘unfair’ (Omevedt, 
1993). Omevedt (1993) argues that many social movements represent groups that 
were ignored as exploited by traditional Marxism. These challenges to class 
methodology she argues must be met by a reconstruction of a concept of exploitation 
to consider categories such as caste, gender and ethnicity (Omevedt, 1993). This 
approach allows for the consideration of certain social groups e.g. other animals that 
are ignored in Marx’s theory of exploitation, as well as understanding this in context 
to other kinds of oppression. 
 
Most factory farmed animals can not walk, run, stretch freely, or be part of a family 
or herd, they live for only a fraction of their normal life span, they are bought and 
sold at the will of humans, and their bodies and their labour are used for human ends 
with little consideration of their own needs and interests (Singer, 2002:227). The 
industrialised nature of food production is centred on manipulating other animals and 
their environments for the purposes of increasing efficiency and profitability. This 
relationship between humans and other animals is significantly impacted by the 
nature of capitalist commodity production. The way we commodify and modify other 
animal’s bodies, the way we use them as objects in production, and the way we 
alienate them from their natural surroundings and behaviours is a relationships 
characterised by dominance and reflects the kind of system they are being subsumed 
in. Our culture is saturated in this type of relationship with other animals, whether it 
is in zoos, laboratories, circuses, and particularly in factory farms and 
slaughterhouses (Adams, 2010:94). The question is how do we conceptualise this 
relationship?  
 
Other animals can be seen to be oppressed to the extent that they are denied species-
specific behaviours, are treated as resources for humans use, and they are 
incarcerated and physically harmed (Cudworth, 2011:169). A possible way to 
proceed from this point is by engaging in Marx’s views on exploitation, which seek 
to understand the material basis of oppression of other animals. Young (1990) argues 
that the injustice of exploitation consists in social and economic processes that are 
about a transfer from one group to another, which produces unequal distributions and 
enable a few to accumulate while they constrain many more. This explanation of 
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oppression and exploitation is more applicable to the describing the relationships 
between humans and other animals in society, in particular in food production. 
Exploitation in this context refers to the use of some being, space or entity as a 
resource for human ends, such as the labour and bodies of other animals used in 
agriculture. This is the definition of exploitation I will refer to from here onwards.  
 
Our capitalist economic system and supporting legal, political and educational 
institutions legitimise the commodification and exploitation of other animals. This 
involves placing other animals in conditions that eliminate their enjoyment, that 
frustrate their natural instincts, cause acute discomfort, boredom, and denial of 
welfare (Harrison, 1964:3). Our culture generally accepts the oppression of other 
animals and finds nothing ethically or politically disturbing about their exploitation 
for the benefit of humans (Adams, 2010:94). ‘For those who hold the dominant 
viewpoint in our culture, the surprise is not that animals are oppressed (though this 
not the term they would use to express human beings’ relationship to the other 
animals), the surprise is that anyone would object to this’ (Adams, 2010:94). This is 
consistent with Marx’s theory about the superstructure (the social and political 
institutions of society) playing the role of legitimising mechanisms in the existing 
economic order.  
 
Young (1990) argues that injustices of exploitation cannot be eliminated just by 
redistribution of goods, for as long as institutionalised practises and structural 
relations remain unaltered, unequal power dynamics will be replicated. For example, 
Singer (1995) identifies the ideology of speciesism, the moral prejudice in favour of 
humans based on being a member of a certain species, as important for legitimising 
the exploitation of other animals for human ends in western societies. This is 
reflected by Aristotle’s inability to see the equality of slaves because of the class 
nature of Greek society. In the same way, institutionalised practices and structural 
relations distort the ability to see the character of human relationships with other 
animals. These social and economic relations as Marx suggests are not natural, they 
are historically and economically contingent. To understand another feature at the 
heart of exploitation of other animals let’s now turn to how the commodity form 
conceals the nature of the relationship between humans and other animals. 
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Chapter 5: Visibility and the Animal Protection Movement   
 
When’s the last time you saw a pig? (Babe doesn’t count.) Except for our pets, real 
animals – animals living and dying – no longer figure in our everyday lives. Meat 
comes from the grocery store, where it is cut and packaged to look as little like parts 
of animals as possible. The disappearance of animals from our lives has opened a 
space in which there’s no reality check, either on the sentiment or the brutality 
(Pollan, 2002).  
 
For most humans who live in western urban communities the most direct form of 
contact we have with other animals is at meal times and in our supermarkets (Singer, 
2002). It is here where we buy meat, eggs and dairy uniformly and neatly packaged, 
it barely bleeds and rarely resembles the body of the living, breathing, walking, 
suffering animal from which it came. It is here, that we are brought into contact with 
the most extensive exploitation of other animals that has ever existed (Singer, 
2002:95). Over the past 200 hundred years as large urban centers emerged and 
populations centralized, other animals have been progressively moved out of the 
vicinity and sight of most western populations (O’Sullivan, 2011:2). Today, although 
other animals remain an important part of the economy, in research, fashion and food, 
the contribution they make and the work they do remains confined to the fringes of 
society out of sight (O’Sullivan, 2011:3).  As a strategy to combat the exploitation 
and suffering of other animals used in humans society, organisation and individual’s 
part of the animal protection movement attempt to enhance the visibility of other 
animal suffering amidst a sea of decontextualized consumer products (Soron, 2011). 
This kind of campaigning suggests that the inaccessibility of animal suffering, hidden 
away in factory farms and slaughterhouses contributes to the perpetuation of that 
suffering (O’Sullivan, 2011).  
 
Pollan (2006:333) argues that ‘were the walls of our meat industry to become 
transparent literally or even figuratively, we would no longer continue to raise, kill 
and eat animals the way we do. Tail docking and sow crates and beak clipping would 
disappear over night, and the days of slaughtering 400 head of cattle an hour would 
come to an end. For who could stand the sight?’ Activists and organisations 
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attempting to enhance the visibility of animal suffering, appear to perceive this as 
their primary function, circulating disturbing images of abattoirs, vivisection 
facilities, fur farms, kill floors etc. in order to make humans aware of the realities that 
are often obscured or concealed from society (Soron, 2011). Organisations around the 
world such as Compassion in World Farming, People For the Protection of Animals, 
the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection, Mercy for Animals, Anonymous 
for Animal Rights and Animals Australia spend much of their time and money on 
uncovering operations, the purpose of which is to obtain images of animals in 
contexts the public are not normally exposed to (O’Sullivian, 2011:47). For example, 
both Animals Australia (2015b) and the RSPCA (2011) have a fact page on sheep 
mulesing in Australia. Mulesing is a practice that aims to reduce the incidence of 
flystrike (where fly’s lay eggs under the sheep’s skin) (Animals Australia, 2015b). 
This involves cutting away the skin and tissues from around the lamb’s anus usually 
without anaesthetic to produce a scar free wool, without faecal/urine stains and skin 
wrinkles (Animals Australia, 2015b). In making these images and this information 
accessible for the public, organisations emphasise a link between visibility and the 
way other animals are treated in food production.  
 
Documentaries such as Food Inc. and Earthlings have also unveiled slaughterhouse 
and factory farm practices, attempting to instil a higher level of consciousness to 
eating, making the invisible, visible. The People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 
(PETA, 2002) produced a short documentary called Meet Your Meat, which includes 
the assertion that ‘once you see for yourself the routine cruelty involved in raising 
animals for food, you’ll understand why millions of compassionate people have 
decided to leave meat off their plates for good’. The film depicts cattle being 
castrated, their horns being removed, branding without anaesthetic, the removal of 
calves from their mothers shortly after birth, and chickens bred and drugged to grow 
so quickly that their hearts, lungs, and limbs cannot keep up (PETA, 2002). This idea 
of the metaphoric glass walled slaughterhouse permeates the campaigns of the animal 
protection movement. Actors at every level of the movement, including individuals, 
organisations and academics, adopt this as a central strategy and tactic (Soron, 2011). 
In doing so they attempt to ‘counter distance and concealment as mechanisms of 
power by making them accessible for the eye to see (O’Sullivan, 2011). The 
assumption underlying this is that the community does not realise the many ways in 
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which they are complicit in the harming of other animals and that these practices 
would come to a halt if there were a breach in the confinement of what is invisible. 
Thus, animal advocates commonly place the possession of visibility firmly at the 
centre of the equation for change.  
 
The ‘glass abattoir’ strategy to improve visibility is a powerful and concrete 
expression of the relations between ‘power through transparency’ (Pachirat, 
2011:247). However, this does not properly acknowledge the role of economic 
imperatives in the treatment and use of other animals. Pachirat (2011:253) argues that 
the relation between sight and transformation is more nuanced than ‘simple binaries 
between visible/invisible, plain/hidden and open/confined can accommodate’. This 
approach to social and political transformation has the potential to be hijacked to 
generate more effective ways of assisting capital accumulation. For example, the 
American Meat Institute (2013) developed a campaign to combat the glass wall 
approach of the animal protection movement. The American Meat Institute (2013) 
created both print and video tours of two large beef and pork slaughterhouses in an 
effort to give consumers and the media interested in animal welfare ‘accurate’ 
information about how other animals are handled and slaughtered in U.S. meat 
packing plants. Another example is Fair Oaks Farms (2015) in the U.S who have 
turned their pig and dairy farm into a tourist attraction. Fair Oaks Farm (2015) is a 
commercial factory farm with 36,000 dairy cows and where 2700 sows are 
impregnated to produce 75,000 pigs for slaughter annually. On daily tours humans 
can tour farrowing and gestation barns, watch calves being born, and cows being 
milked on giant mechanised carousels (Fair Oaks Farms, 2015). This large 
commercial factory farm aims to provide transparency by connecting consumers with 
the story behind their food and educating the public about modern farming efforts 
(Fair Oak Farms, 2015). In these examples, industry marketing has in many ways 
defied the logic of transparency campaigns employed by the animal protection 
movement. The logic of ‘who can stand the sight’ has been used in an attempt to 
restore faith in the meat industry, transform the image of factory farms, and harnessed 
to make profit. Making the exploitation and oppression of other animals visible ‘may 
as well result in apathy as action’ (Pachirat, 2011:254).  
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The animal protection movement has advanced powerful and compelling messages 
and campaigns against the treatment of other animals as commodities; however, it has 
tended to regard commodification as a matter of morally inappropriate attitudes rather 
than as a basic drive of the capitalist mode of production. The conditions other 
animals are subjected to exist to a large degree because of the definition of other 
animals as commodities and as food (a social construction exacerbated by the 
fundamental processes of the capitalist market), and the drive for capital 
accumulation (Winders and Nibert, 2004). Francione (2000:166) argues that the 
acceptance of the commodity status of other animals underpins our ‘moral 
schizophrenia’ towards them. This paradoxical relationship with other animals is 
most apparent in relation to the way we consider them both as friends and as food. 
Some other animals we view as subjects – those companion animals that we love and 
are part of our families – and other animals we treat as objects – those that humans 
stick their forks into at the dinner table (Morgan and Cole, 2011:112). Without 
acknowledging this link between capitalism and the exploitation of other animals, the 
animal protection movements will face obstacles in alleviating all the various forms 
of entangled oppression (Winders and Nibert, 2004). Therefore, visibility may be a 
necessary but not sufficient element for change. Marx’s concept of commodity 
fetishism enables us to retain a sense of moral opposition to the commodification and 
exploitation of other animals, while considering how this relationship is impersonally 
mediated through market exchange and tied directly to the capitalist commodity 
production.  
 
Commodity Fetishism  
 
Commodity fetishism refers to the way in which the exchange process detaches 
commodities from the social relations of their production (Marx, 1887). As discussed 
in chapter 3, Marx (1887) argues that in the exchange of use values the social 
relationship between humans and their labour becomes merely a relationship between 
things.  In the realm of exchange we are presented with commodities removed from 
their productive origins and we experience them primarily as objects to be exchanged 
(Marx, 1887:46). Therefore, we perceive the value of commodities in relation to one 
another rather than the labour that went into them (Marx, 1887:46). It is this 
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condition that defines the fetishism, which attaches itself to the products of labour as 
soon as they are produced as commodities. The result is that the social relations of 
production are disguised by the objective materiality of commodities and the type of 
value that prevails in the sphere of exchange. Therefore, the invisibility of the 
conditions in which commodities are produced is related to the fetishism of 
commodities as Marx conceived it. However, there is a difference between making 
something visible and actually being able to understand the network of relationships 
and processes that are at work in the production of commodities. Other animals used 
in food production even when depicted in images of factory farms and 
slaughterhouses in many ways still maintain object status.  
 
In looking at the commodification of other animals, it can be seen how commodity 
fetishism works to hide the exploitation of other animals. For example, when humans 
consume chicken nuggets there is no remnants left of chicken that died to produce it, 
nor of the overcrowded, hot tin shed he or she lived in for their short, painful life 
before they were slaughtered. Commodities appear as simple consumables, divorced 
from their entire productive history characterised by exploitation and oppression. 
However, the fetishism of commodities cannot be challenged and the exploitative 
relations are not necessarily apparent simply through visual depictions of productive 
conditions. Harvey (2010:41) argues that attempts like this that aim to bridge the 
distance between production and exchange usually fail to challenge the social 
relations that produce and sustain the conditions of inequality and exploitation. Recall 
that Marx viewed value to be a concept specific to capitalism; thus, the fetishism of 
commodities is an unavoidable condition of the capitalist mode of commodity 
production. ‘The whole mystery of commodities, all the magic and necromancy that 
surrounds the products of labour as long as they take the form of commodities, 
vanishes therefore, so soon as we come to other forms of production’ (Marx, 
1987:49). Therefore, revealing how animal products are fetishized requires an 
analysis of how other animals are used and objectified in production, and how this is 
inextricably linked to the way that capitalist production produces commodities.  
 
The objectification of other animals does not just happen on the shelves at 
supermarkets, it happens in the production process as discussed in chapter 2-4 and it 
also pervades the way we culturally conceive of other animals. Inevitably other 
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animals are used by most of the population through one form or another as resources. 
Thus, there is a role to be played by culture in the construction of other animals as 
commodities as well. Although an analysis of the ideological commodification and 
objectification of other animals falls outside the scope of this thesis, it is important to 
acknowledge that the social and cultural realms of society reinforce and justify the 
economic commodification and exploitation of other animals (Nibert, Torres, 27). 
Therefore, visually revealing the conditions of other animals in factory farms and 
slaughterhouses does not necessarily make apparent all of the intricacies of 
productive relations, such as, alienation, exploitation, or the capacity of other animals 
to labour and resist. Transparency in the food industry is not enough to restore that 
subjectivity of other animals required for challenging the way commodification 
objectifies and ‘de-animalises’ other animals (Adams, 2010).  
 
In conclusion, the concept of commodity fetishism enables us to understand how 
capitalist commodity production can contribute to the complacency of consumers. 
Commodities materiality conceals the social relations in which they are produced, 
and they appear on the shelves detached from their productive origins. Animal 
advocates often focus on this disconnect and ascribe considerable importance to 
bridging this gap by making the community more aware of animal suffering. The 
impulse to link sight and political transformation is strong, however, this does not 
properly acknowledge the role of economic imperatives in shaping the treatment and 
use of other animals. Commodity fetishism is important for understanding how the 
structure of capitalist commodity production itself is caught up in this process of 
distancing humans from the realities of production. Therefore, the concept helps us 
understand how the commodity form is at the heart of animal alienation and 
exploitation.  
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Conclusion 
 
In 2011, ABC’s Four Corners program did an exposé on the treatment of live 
Australian cattle exported to Indonesia (Animals Australia, 2011). The program 
depicted graphic footage of cows being beaten and slaughtered in troubling ways in 
an Indonesian slaughterhouse (Animals Australia, 2011). At the time it received 
widespread media attention, including articles in The Age and Sydney Morning 
Herald, it featured in major news programs, Animals Australia and RSPCA launched 
campaigns to ban live animal export and petitions were set up even by non-animal 
NGOs including GetUp. Consequently, on the 8th of June 2011, Prime Minister 
Gillard announced a suspension on the live cattle trade to Indonesia (Animals 
Australia, 2011). This live export ban was lifted a mere month later without much 
public protest (Animals Australia, 2011). Condemnation also spread through 
Australian social and public media recently in reaction to coverage on the annual 
Yulin dog eating festival in China and in response to the spectacle of bullfighting in 
Spain (Koziol, 2015). However, the gigantic mechanized apparatus whose sole 
function is to produce, destroy and process the bodies of millions of other animals 
each year receives little to no mainstream public attention. Acts of violence against 
other animals are a daily norm in most societies around the world. The violence has 
become so normalised that we only become aware of it when the apparatus is 
unexpectedly disrupted (Sanbonmatsu, 2011). Only then does an otherwise invisible 
system of ‘mass killing emerge briefly from the background of daily life to enter the 
public’s consciousness and then only as a spectacle’ (Sanbonmatsu, 2011:3).  
 
Similarly, questions about our relationships with other animals have ebbed and 
flowed throughout the history of philosophical thought (see chapter 1). The most 
influential statements of moral concern for other animals have come from theories of 
utilitarianism and liberal rights theory, which inform much of the current advocacy 
work of both individuals and organisations (Nibert, 2002). Their strategies for change 
tend to focus on promoting increased individual awareness, and improving legislative 
protection for other animals. On one hand, it is true that important animal protection 
advances have been made within the framework of liberal rights theory. As more 
legislative progress has been made around the world in the last ten years than in the 
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previous two hundred (Sanbonmatsu, 2011:29). However, although there is a trend of 
states offering greater protection to animals, we also raise, kill and eat more other 
animals than at any other point in history (Cochrane, 2010:2). The global per capita 
consumption of meat has more than doubled between 1961 and 2007 and is expected 
to double again by 2050 (Cochrane, 2010:2).  
 
Mainstream animal protection literature makes the conditions in factory farms and 
slaughterhouses seem as if they in some way exist in isolation from the global 
economic system. In chapter 1 it was argued that while the animal movement 
criticises the treatment of other animals as commodities, commodification is not 
viewed as a feature of capitalist production (Soron, 2011:61). Although economic 
factors that primarily lead to the oppression of other animals go back thousands of 
years to the latter stages of hunting and gathering societies, the nature of our current 
relationship with other animals is particularly shaped by capitalist imperatives (see 
chapter 2) (Nibert, 2002:237). ‘In the early stages of domestication humans invaded 
and became part of the animal social systems … but under industrial capitalism these 
systems are no longer intact so that animals have become reduced to mere 
appendages of computers and machines…Present day capitalism tends eliminate 
anything in the animal which cannot be made productive. The animal is modified to 
suit the production system and its offending parts simply cut off’ (Noske, 1997:20). 
Chapter 2 argues that to increase profitability, capitalists adopt practices and 
technologies that reduce the amount of labour time necessary for producing 
commodities by increasing the efficiency and productivity of production (Gunderson, 
2011). Capitalism is predominantly concerned with accumulating capital, which is at 
odds with the welfare of other animals.  
 
This is not to say that the numerous books, articles, pamphlets, lectures, conferences 
and protests challenging the oppression of other animals in the last quarter century 
are unimportant, however, such critiques tend to focus on the morality of how we 
treat other animals. Concerns for the suffering of other animals may be ethical, but 
the way we treat and use other animals is integrally linked to the nature of capitalist 
commodity production. Furthermore, animal suffering has significantly increased and 
is intrinsically linked to the rise and spread of capitalist commodity production. Some 
critical theorists have started to point to capitalism as key to animal suffering 
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including Benton (1993), Gunderson (2011), Nibert (2002), Noske (1997), 
Sanbonmatsu (2011), and Torres (2007). These theorists have begun to provide an 
explanation for animal suffering rather than just a description of it (Gunderson, 
2011:260). This thesis has attempted to contribute to this growing body of literature 
in arguing that capital’s drive for expansion and accumulation is in a large way 
contributing to the suffering of other animals used in food production. To make this 
argument, this thesis has predominantly used a Marxist conceptual framework.  
 
It has become common for animal protection scholars to accuse Marx and his work of 
being speciesist and anthropocentric (Kowalczyk, 2014). Benton (1993:42) argues 
that Marx was ‘wrong about animals in ways which cut him off from a powerful 
extension and deepening of his own ethical critique of prevailing modes of 
appropriation of nature’. As was discussed in chapter 3, Marx did go to some lengths 
to highlight the discontinuities between humans and other animals in his analysis. In 
contrast, mainstream animal protection philosophy tends to emphasise the 
commonalities between humans and other animals to justify moral consideration 
(Cochrane, 2010). Whether it be the shared capacity for suffering as emphasised by 
Bentham and Singer, or the shared capacity for intentional action as emphasised by 
Regan, these continuities serve as the central argument for the extension of justice to 
other animals (Cochrane, 2010:96). Consequently, many advocates feel accepting any 
discontinuity between humans and other animals detracts from the case for animal 
liberation (Cochrane, 2010). However, Marx’s account of the uniqueness of human 
labour, whilst not entirely accurate, is not necessarily detrimental to the protection of 
other animals. It is important to recognise that other animals are different to humans 
and that they are a heterogeneous group, all with different capacities. The moral 
consideration of other animals should not be attached to their similarities to humans. 
Therefore, the disparities between humans and other animals that Marx emphasises 
do not necessarily discredit his ability to contribute to an analysis of other animals.  
 
Marx’s critique of capitalist logic of expansion and accumulation, his analysis of 
value, the commodity form, and the way that the class system leads to alienation and 
exploitation provides insight into the way other animals are treated within current 
agricultural conditions. However, just because Marxist concepts and forms of 
analysis can be applied to other animals does not mean that Marxism is perfectly 
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suitable for an analysis of other animals. For Marx, the qualitative differences 
between humans and other animals mean that other animals are not important 
subjects in his analysis of the economic system. Chapter 3, 4 and 5 are dedicated to 
reconsider other animals using Marx’s conceptual framework.  
 
This thesis challenged Marx’s exclusion of other animals from the analysis of 
alienation, labour and exploitation. Chapter 3 disputed the idea that it is humans’ 
species being, (our ability to intentionally labour) that results in us being alienated 
when subsumed into the productive process. This chapter argued that other animals 
may not experience loss in the same way as human labour in production; however, 
they do experience a form of alienation. Chapter 4 argued that although other animals 
may not fit accurately into a traditional Marxist class analysis and the emancipatory 
potential the working class, it is possible to broaden categories of labour, resistance 
and exploitation to capture the way capitalist relations shape the experiences of other 
animals particularly in food production. Lastly, chapter 5 demonstrated that 
commodity fetishism is useful in understanding the way that the commodity form 
conceals the reality of relations between humans and other animals in the production 
of commodities.  
 
In sum, it is possible to include other animals in the analysis of capitalism using a 
Marxist framework. However, the concepts cannot be simply appropriated to include 
other animals. Some concepts are specifically designed to exclude other animals as 
unimportant actors. Marxism is particularly useful for historicising the relations of 
production and treatment of other animals, dispelling ideas that normalise and 
naturalise conditions such as the commodification of other animals. Marxism 
reorients the economic in an analysis of societal power relations.  
 
So what is the relationship between the treatment of other animals and capitalism? 
Firstly, it is clear that capitalism does not cause the exploitation of other animals. 
Other animals have been used as resources throughout history in war, in transport, to 
aid hunting, as food and as entertainment (Torres, 2008). However, this thesis argued 
that certain features of capitalist production exacerbate the suffering of other animals. 
Furthermore, capitalism shapes the nature of animal exploitation and alienation in 
contemporary society. The industrialised nature of food production, the demand for 
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huge quantities of meat and the capitalist imperative to accumulate capital has led 
directly to other animals being bred, confined, fattened, and slaughtered in the most 
cost effective ways. These intensive forms of production produce cheaper meat, dairy 
and eggs for consumers, and wider profit margins for capitalists at the expense of 
other animals. Other animal’s whole lives are shaped by this capitalist logic, from the 
food they eat, to the length of time they live, their interactions with other animals, 
their physical surroundings, and contact with nature. Capitalism may not be the cause 
of the suffering of other animals, but it certainly has been a contributing factor in 
increasing both its scale and severity.  
 
Is capitalism a necessary impediment for achieving justice for animals? This thesis 
has predominantly been about understanding how and why other animals are being 
treated in the way they are in modern capitalists societies, not explaining how other 
animals should be treated. However, it is important to address why that was not 
considered in this thesis. Firstly, Marxism is not primarily a normative theory; the 
concept of how we should treat other animals is largely irrelevant for Marxists. 
Secondly, Marx’s insights into overcoming exploitative capitalist relations, involves 
fundamental social and economic transformation. However, as argued above 
capitalism is not entirely responsible for the status of other animals in society. 
Therefore, the implications of this analysis do not follow the natural Marxists 
conclusions (i.e. overthrow capitalism and instituting socialism).  
 
Putting all this aside, the answer probably depends on the definition of justice used. If 
justice means improving the conditions of other animals and decreasing the level of 
suffering, then legislative change and consumer awareness might be powerful enough 
to achieve these changes. However, if justice means abolition of the use of other 
animals as resources then this may require more substantial structural change. As this 
kind of change would have considerable impacts for powerful capitalist vested 
interests. In sum, while Marxism has been useful for providing insight into the way 
other animals are used in food production, it does not mean that Marxism is 
necessarily suitable for extending justice to animals. However, Marxism is important 
for acknowledging the role of economic forces in the treatment of other animals, 
which is important for achieving change for other animals.  
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Where to from here? This thesis has left many unanswered questions. Many Marxists 
concepts rely on binary thinking that relegates entities involved in production to 
either object status or human subject status. However, this thesis argued that other 
animals are neither machines nor humans in the production process, they occupy a 
complex position as commodities and labour, thus, it is important to theoretically 
distinguish them. Including other animals as labour could potentially help allocate 
them more accurately as subjects in the productive process, however, the concept of 
labour needs broadening. A was discussed in chapter 4, Marx’s definition of labour is 
quite specifically describing the capabilities of humans in production. Although other 
animals may not meet this narrow definition, there are particular cases where they 
display qualities that could be considered labour by another definition. Other animals 
do actively contribute to the production of commodities in factory farms and 
slaughterhouses, whether it is through their biological capabilities of reproduction 
and growth or just their ability to move. Thus, ‘objective factors of production’ does 
not seem to properly describe the way other animals participate in production. 
Classifying the contribution of other animals as labour could also potentially aid the 
animal protection movements attempt to emphasise the subjectivity of other animals. 
Additionally, the concept of resistance needs to be reworked to capture the 
capabilities of other animals and not just in context to humans’ capacity for 
resistance. This too could restore subjectivity to other animals in theory.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis has been about providing an explanation for the suffering of 
other animals. Using a Marxist framework, the suffering and exploitation of other 
animals has been linked to the alienating nature of labour, the use of other animals for 
human gains, the nature of capitalist commodity production and the capitalist profit 
motive. The exploitation of other animals in food production to a large extent is a 
result of the definition of other animals as commodities and as food (Adams, 2010). 
However, the drive to commodify nature and the conditions in factory farms and 
slaughterhouses are constructed fundamentally by the capitalist drive for expansion 
and accumulation. Marxism has been particularly useful in contextualising the 
treatment of other animals and analysing the way capitalism exacerbates the suffering 
of other animals. Overall it is clear that economic components of oppression are 
crucial for understanding the suffering and exploitation of other animals in food 
production.  
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